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Abstract – Hamlet’s desire must be examined in relation to the desire to be, that is 
the desire for identity: this is the claim upheld in this study. Consequently, the arti-
cle begins by making a distinction between the desire to be and the desire to have: 
this distinction was expressed in a new way by Freud, but was never adequately 
developed either by Freud himself or by Lacan. Therefore, the desire to be has re-
mained prisoner of the Oedipus complex, even in Lacan’s reformulation in which it 
basically proves to be the desire to be the Phallus. 
Yet the desire to be must be understood starting from the “modal revolution” intro-
duced by Heidegger, and this allows us to appreciate the more innovative thesis in 
Freud’s essay, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921). Identity is a 
relationship that may be considered to be a coincidence or a non-coincidence with 
oneself: in the latter case, we will refer to an “overcoming identity.” As a result, 
philosophy, the theory of the subject and the theory of literature are called upon to 
investigate the modes of identity. 
From the perspective of the modes of being, Hamlet is analyzed here starting from 
his refusal to subordinate his own identity to the role of avenger. His desire over-
steps the borders of neurosis and melancholy, in which it had traditionally been im-
prisoned (also by Lacan). Hamlet is a hero of non-coincidence: he goes beyond the 
models that appear to him to be inadequate and attempts to construct a flexible 
identity. Adopting the mask of madness, he has the opportunity to display his lin-
guistic creativity. This does not deny that Hamlet is a tormented hero: the shadow 
of his father and the lust of his mother are obstacles to the desire for identity. 
This interpretation is only delineated in the last pages of the article. It is first neces-
sary to show that the limitations of Lacan’s interpretation derive from a narrow con-
ception of the Symbolic and the desire to be for which Lacan never acknowledges 
creative possibilities. The Lacanian notion of “lack” is a logical and epistemological 
obstacle that prevents the development of the logic of flexibility and the non of 
“non-coincidence.” 
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1. The Need for a Parricide—There Is No “Adaequatio” for Desire 
What is Hamlet’s desire? What enigma is hidden within the most enigmatic of Shakespeare’s 
characters? Hamlet is undeniably one of the hardest testing grounds for any theory of desire 
and identity and we will shortly see how these two notions are more closely linked than phi-
losophy and psychoanalysis have so far imagined. Firstly, we should specify the aims of this 
article, which will not be able to examine the main interpretations of Shakespeare’s work, even 
though they will be taken into account: my intention is to re-read the pages Lacan dedicated 
to Hamlet in the Seminar VI, to discuss not only his reading of this work, but the validity of 
what he says regarding desire and interpretation. These are the problems mentioned in the title of 
the Seminar, held between 1958 and 1959: a title that hinges on the word and, the coherency 
of which needs to be grasped. Undoubtedly, facts exist that are uninterpretable, states of things 
for which the concept of truth as adaequatio appears entirely valid: yet referring to these insur-
mountable points of resistance when making a denial, which is as easy as it is silly, of Nie-
tzsche’s famous remark “there are no facts, only interpretations,” implies that “the snow is 
white” and “the cat is on the carpet” are excellent examples of what we should understand by 
facts, and that interpretation is a term that means injections of sense, to whose subjectivity and 
arbitrariness it would be difficult to set limits.1 Nonetheless, even after placing an eventual 
restriction on Nietzsche’s thesis, nothing could induce us to extend the adaequatio intellectus et 
rei to the dimension of desire: a desire—not a need!—exists only in interpretation, that is in 
the conflict of interpretations. Interpretation demands a conflictual reading. 
But why abandon Nietzsche’s thesis without having understood it, or better interpreted it? 
Why not postulate that interpretation means “style of thought”? Thought is always modalized by a 
style: is this not perhaps the assumption at the basis of a theory of interpretation that leaves 
behind it all hermeneutics of the meaning? We can speak about facts, and deliberate over their 
existence, only within a separative style; but we will not be able to conduct an investigation 
into desire with the separative procedures.  
This, then, is our starting point from which we will also assess Lacan’s legacy. We will 
inevitably be forced to acknowledge that the plurality of styles, in other words the plurality of 
logics, is unable to find a way to manifest itself adequately in Lacan’s conception. Like the 
other great authors (Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud) of what I have called the modal revolution,2 
Lacan, for different reasons, remains in midstream. And yet his contribution to this turning 
point was, without doubt, extraordinary: it is thanks to Lacan’s register theory that we have 
 
1 The bêtise of realism is concentrated in these assumptions. 
2 I cannot help but refer to Bottiroli, La ragione flessibile. Modi d’essere e stili di pensiero. 
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been able to develop the relational concept of identity and drive it towards the ways of being. 
What then is there in his elaboration that is incomplete and what is passé and wrong? 
I am going to start a strict investigation and question some of Lacan’s fundamental theses: 
therefore, my claims constitute a gesture which, in the light of the undeniable debts I have 
towards him, I cannot help but consider a parricide.3 It is a “Hamletic” gesture, to the extent 
that it has been deferred and procrastinated for many years. The inspiration behind my reading 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis is a consensus intertwined with the fact that I distanced myself 
from it, right from my first re-interpretation of “The Purloined Letter,” the tale by Poe that 
Lacan understood as a device hinged upon the styles of thought, and to which he dedicated 
some striking  lines, before losing the perception of a path that had only barely  been glimpsed.4 
A missed opportunity, we may say, as it could have induced Lacan to rid himself of the equiv-
alence between the Symbolic and the Law, to no longer conceive of the Symbolic as a place of 
codes, but to think of it instead as the space of intellectual complexity: the only dimension in 
which the fecundity of the conflict between styles may express itself in all its abundance. The 
consequences of reducing the Symbolic to a prevalently rigid sphere should be obvious: flexi-
bility, which finds its greatest and most creative possibilities in the Symbolic, cannot be thought 
of in the Imaginary or in the Real, unless it tends towards the pathological. But what makes 
this error so grave? Is it not perhaps plausible to claim that human intelligence is overwhelm-
ingly characterized by rigidity? And does excellence not exist perhaps in rigidity? The so-called 
hard sciences, are they not knowledge oriented towards the rigid? Hasn’t the logic boasted by 
the human mind nearly always tried to find guarantees of its validity in principles and infer-
ences that see a danger in flexibility? How many centuries did it take after Heraclitus, before 
we returned to plan and define a logic of links, where opposites are not destined to mutually 
exclude each other?   
Montesquieu’s splendid definition, “l’homme, cet être flexible,” which has not been ade-
quately expanded on, certainly cannot hide the extraordinary propensity for the rigid that char-
acterizes our species. Freud referred to three narcissistic blows, that belittle man in his own 
eyes: that of  Copernicus, that of Darwin, and finally, that for which psychoanalysis is respon-
sible, insofar as it demonstrates that man is not the master in his own house (see Freud, “A 
Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis”). Three blows to our vanity, to which a fourth seems 
to be added nowadays: the possibility that we will be replaced by machinery not only for the 
performance of manual tasks, but also intellectual ones. In actual fact, machines are able to 
equal and surpass our mental capacities as long as they move in the dimension of the rigid. 
Whenever thought follows paths that are entirely articulated, segmented or unequivocal in 
areas which can be clearly and precisely circumscribed by a frame—as in the case of a chess-
board, to mention one example where the superiority of procedures based on the afore-men-
tioned criteria has imposed itself—, then humanity appears simulatable and surpassable. This 
then is the fourth narcissistic blow: to have to realize that 99% of our intelligence could be 
governed by rigidity, and that human creativity depends on a mere 1%, in other words a tiny 
remnant that is also the driving force behind wonderful conquests.  
Now, the rigid view of the Symbolic does not appear to us to be like a crude mistake, but 
more like an excusable fallacy. And yet, if the human condition finds its greatest possibilities 
in flexibility, this fallacy, this deformation of perspective weighs on Lacan’s Symbolic as much 
as the dwarf on Zarathustra’s shoulder (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Third Part, “On the 
 
3 A parricide? An Aufhebung? We will see, but in any case, not a simple negation. 
4 The best confirmation of this missed opportunity may be seen in the blunt comment of Jacques-Alain 
Miller, according to whom “The Purloined Letter” is “a children’s story” (Detached pieces. The texts come 
from a course given by Miller—Pièces détachées—in Paris in 2004-05 and published in La cause freudi-
enne). For a reinterpretation of Lacan’s interpretation, see Bottiroli, Che cos’è la teoria della letteratura 178–88. 
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Vision and the Riddle”). Is it not perhaps the spirit of gravity that has accentuated the punitive 
and privative position in the Symbolic? 
A different view of the Symbolic will change the whole theory of registers and even the 
conception of desire. This leads to the need for a parricide, for which a first formulation is 
offered here: higher than the theory of registers stands the thought of flexibility, the philosophy of the Metis.  
 
 
2. The Modal Revolution and Its Categories 
Although I am obliged to present the concept of flexibility in just a few pages and very sche-
matically, I trust that the essential points will be clear. I will be very brief, even later on when 
I mention the limits and errors in Lacan’s theory: what counts, apart from clarity, is the vision 
as a whole.  We need to understand how bad coherence hinders better coherence. 
Let us begin by defining flexibility. What are the foundations and the role of a notion which, 
according to the most widely spread habits, seems to be easily grasped and unrelated to the 
philosophical dimension? The fact that little attention has been paid to this category should 
not astonish us: as we have just said, our culture has mainly looked for the possibility of sur-
vival, control of the environment, social organization, and so on, in rigid procedures. However, 
something has changed over the last two centuries, starting from Romanticism; and many 
changes are still in progress. Today, the greatest danger is that rigid intelligence restrains human 
beings below their superior possibilities. Therefore, the notion of flexibility must not be bent 
or confined to adaptive behaviours that are sensitive to their contexts, but should be under-
stood as a philosophical category, that is as one of the supreme concepts, one of the concepts that 
perform an essential and strategic function in the organization of a theory: these are the cate-
gories—not general labels, but principles endowed with productive and heuristic strength. 
Firstly, then, flexibility is a philosophical category; secondly, it is a modal category. Once again, 
it is no surprise to realize that it has never belonged to the modal categories contemplated by 
tradition, and referred to by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason: possibility–impossibility, existence–
non-existence, necessity–contingency. This list is governed implicitly by rigidity: created by 
gradual restriction, it delineates the space of the possibility, which is selected by the actuality 
and culminates in necessity, in other words, in “what cannot be otherwise.” Let us suppose, 
though, that we eliminate the category of necessity, that many are wary of: possibility, in any 
case, remains ontologically inferior to actuality. However, in modern philosophy, another per-
spective first announced by Heidegger, has gained ground: “Higher than actuality [Wirklichkeit] 
stands possibility” (Being and Time 36). 
In my interpretation, this is the announcement of a modal revolution: the classic doctrine of 
modalities (as I will call it) assigned the lowest rank to possibility. Heidegger upturns this doc-
trine, but without revealing the reason behind this reversal and without developing its conse-
quences, which are only hinted at. However, it is evident that, in the new theory, possibility 
can no longer be understood as “not yet real and not always necessary” (Heidegger, Being and Time 
139): possibility has become power—the Nietzschean “will to power.”  
Yet, there is another decisive choice to be made: indeed, power can either be conceived of 
as energy, élan vital, the proliferating of the multiple, and this is the simplest path, already em-
barked upon by Bergson and taken up again by Deleuze, or as a conflict between possibilities, 
the active or superior ones and the reactive or inferior ones: this is Nietzsche’s path and will 
also be the one of Heidegger and psychoanalysis, as they will attribute crucial importance to 
language. 
Obviously, language too is reconsidered: it is no longer a tool of communication, governed 
by codes, but an entwinement and conflict of styles; to the first pair of new modal categories, 
that is rigid and flexible, another is added, dense and articulated. The work of art becomes the most 
appropriate opportunity for verifying the new doctrine, since the semantic density that all 
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works tend towards, but which only some manage to achieve, is “the forever articulable,” the 
forever interpretable. And interpretation acquires a new and precise meaning: there is inter-
pretation only where unprecedented articulations are experienced, in relation to possibilities. 
But possibility as power, no longer subordinate to the rigid, demands a third pair of modal 
categories, which complete (at least temporarily) the new list of categories: the undivided and the 
divided. Is power not perhaps overcoming oneself, and one’s own boundaries? “And this secret 
life itself spoke to me: ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must always overcome itself.’” (Nietzsche, 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra 89).5 The will to power is the urge not to coincide with oneself. The non of 
non-coincidence then becomes the object of desire: returning to Lacan, the non becomes object 
(a) for the desire to be. 
 
 
3. Ontology of Desire 
Prior to Freud, the real and full-scale possibilities of the desire to be had never been analyzed. 
Of course, it had been appeared in a number of speeches, but always marginally. Philosophy 
was unable to imagine what this expression would unleash in a setting that was ill-prepared to 
understand the modes of non-coincidence. Ill-prepared—but, we should add, willing to ex-
clude every non-separative conception of identity. 
Some obstacles had to be removed: (a) the oblivion of ontological difference, that is to say 
the reduction of ontology to an ontic, to a philosophy of entities; (b) the primacy of properties 
over possibilities. These two obstacles were only overcome thanks to Heidegger, and a new 
horizon was opened up: instead of continuing to look for the properties common to all entities, 
Heidegger pointed out the difference between the entity that belongs to the modal blend of 
actuality (the innerworldly being) and the one that belongs to the blend of possibilities: Dasein, 
the entity that we ourselves are. I believe that in these extraordinary innovations we should see 
confirmation of my thesis that sees Heidegger as the main interpreter of the modal revolution, 
even though he did not know how to make it sufficiently explicit, nor sufficiently solid or 
complete. Nonetheless, for the first time human beings were defined in their ontological-
modal condition: their being consists of the possibility to be. 
There was a third obstacle, that Heidegger only sensed: (c) it was necessary to free oneself 
from what he called “the logic of the intellect” (“What is Metaphysics?” 85) that is to say the 
rigid, disjunctive or separative logic. It should not be got rid of or eliminated, because the 
separative is a style of thought that is essential in many situations and capable of achieving its 
own excellence, but it should be confined within its own boundaries. An ontology that is not 
restricted to the ontic requires a new logic that we can refer to using various expressions: 
conjunctive logic, insofar as it is in opposition to the separative one; logic of flexibility, as it rebels 
against the alliance that philosophical and logical thought established, maintained and still in 
part maintains with rigidity; logic of correlatives, because, as we will shortly see, this is the relation-
ship that logic has always marginalized or excluded, from Aristotle to Frege; logic of non-coinci-
dence, as it overturns the assumption of identity understood only in the mode of coincidence. 
Now we are able to comprehend why the desire to be was never fully analyzed in all its 
actual possibilities, up until Freud. The verb to be, the most enigmatic of all the verbs, was 
constantly trivialized, even to the point of that total emptiness registered by Nietzsche: the last 
smoke of evaporating reality (Twilight of Idols). The desire to be was the desire of being, that is 
to say addressed towards the supreme entity (for example, Plato’s ideas): in the Symposium, this 
desire separates itself from sensible things to rise towards the vast sea of Beauty. It was the 
desire for fullness, and it remains such in Sartre: an aspiration towards the synthesis between 
 
5 “Und diess Geheimniss redete das Leben selber zu mir. ‘Siehe, sprach es, ich bin das, was sich immer 
selber überwinden muss’” (Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra 148). 
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in-itself and for-itself. And, in the desire of synthesis, being continued to be marked by coin-
cidence, if not by a static nature). According to the tradition that has established itself for so 
long and which we find today in the so-called analytical philosophy, the desire to be is not only 
subordinate to the desire to have but it is based on it. Desire is the wish to have a thing, 
whether it is sensible or meta empirical. 
It could not be otherwise in the objective presence (Vorhandenheit) philosophies, which are 
hinged on the relationship between the subject and an object located in a frontal position and 
accessible with basic or technologically sophisticated tools, but which remains, in any case, well 
apart. The object offers itself to the gaze of the desire to have, it is a sight captured first and 
foremost with the eyes. 
In order for the desire to be to detach itself from the desire to have and conquer its auton-
omy and its distinctiveness, the modal revolution is needed: it is necessary to pass from identity to 
the modes of identity. In fact, as long as the identity remains a separative relationship, that is a 
relationship that an entity has only with itself, the desire to be will return relentlessly to tread 
the path of the desire to have, or better the path of the entities defined by the separative. One 
may desire to be only in the mode of coincidence. 
The possibility of non-coinciding and, therefore, of desiring non-coincidence, implies an 
ontology and a logic of the divided. Only if an entity is divisible, that is separable from itself, 
only if its identity is defined primarily by the relationship with otherness, will that entity experience the 
non in relation to what it is. 
Freud called this possibility, and this process in which idem becomes alter, “identification.” 
Let’s content ourselves initially with this formulation, which we will obviously have to explore 
in depth. We must not think that idem refers to a “stably formed” subject: on the contrary, 
identification is possible as the subject, which we could call x to underline its incompleteness, 
is an entity “that has not yet been established.”6 This means “potentially never establishable”: 
is this not perhaps what Faust’s bet is all about? Not being satisfied with any form that exist-
ence may assume. Overcoming oneself. Being an overcoming entity. 
A process of identification can involve more or less radical and more or less lasting changes 
for subject x. The change may reach an extreme level of intensity without being long-lasting: 
this is what happens to Dante in Canto V of Inferno, when he identifies himself—according to 
Borges’ hypothesis—with Francesca and her companion: 
 
“Dante relates the fate of the two lovers with an infinite pity, and we sense that he envies their 
fate. Paolo and Francesca are in Hell and he will be saved, but they have loved and he never won 
the love of the woman he loved, Beatrice. There is a certain injustice to this, and Dante must 
feel it as something terrible, now that he is separated from her. In contrast, these two sinners are 
together. They cannot speak to each other, they turn in the black whirlwind without hope, yet 
they are together. When she speaks, she says “we”, speaking for the two of them, another form 
of being together. They are together for eternity; they share Hell – and that, for Dante, must 
have been a kind of Paradise.  
We know that he is quite moved. He then collapses as though he were dead. (Borges, Seven Nights 
18)7 
 
His fainting was probably caused by one of the most conflictual forms of identification: in 
any case, it involves a short identification. But the identifications described by Freud concern 
processes of formation (and remodelling) of the personality, the consequences of which are 
 
6 “[M]an is the animal that has not yet been established” (Nietzsche, Beyond good and evil 68). 
7 See also “I think of Paolo and Francesca, forever united in their Inferno: ‘Questi, che mai da me non fia 
diviso’ (this one, who never shall be parted from me). With appalling love, with anxiety, with admiration, 
with envy” (Borges, The Total Library 301). 
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deep and lasting. Identity for Freud consists of a series of identifications: this is the theory of 
“Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.” 
 
 
4. The Relationships between X and Alter 
Thanks to Freud and to Heidegger, the verb to be has now come to suggest a conflictual di-
mension, the struggle between two possibilities, between two possible ways of being. Yet the 
theory of the divided subject cannot limit itself to this first fundamental distinction. Let us 
consider more closely the relationships between a subject that we prefer to call x instead of 
idem, insofar as it is already a “non-idem,” and alter, with which we will refer to all the possible 
modes of otherness. 
The desire to be has entered the conflict between the will of coincidence and the will of 
non-coincidence. However, this second drive is faced by two possibilities: (a) it may exalt the 
subject, which sees in otherness, especially when it is represented by eminent models, a source 
of inspiration that stimulates it towards a creative emulation: didn’t the great artists of the 
Renaissance perhaps start by copying their masters before surpassing them? Even Leonardo 
da Vinci agreed to “becoming alter” for a short period, joining Verrocchio’s workshop—before 
becoming himself. Or (b) it may constitute the objective on which the subject runs aground.  
Everything depends on the style of identification: distinctive in the first case, confusive in the 
second. Literature offers many examples of confusive identification: Don Quixote and the 
heroes of the cavalry, Emma Bovary and the romantic heroines of the books she read at board-
ing school, Dorian Gray and the protagonist of A rebours, etc., as well as examples of distinctive 
identification: Julien Sorel and Napoleon, Raskol’nikov and the superior men, etc. Having ig-
nored this difference is what makes the concept of mimetic desire so schematic and unpolished 
in René Girard, who considers all identifications as alienations. The great error, Girard’s dis-
astrous simplification, consists of having reduced the desire to be to mimetic desire. On the 
contrary, for Freud and Lacan no identity can constitute itself unless it is through processes of 
“becoming other,” but this does not exclude the possibility of subsequently conquering a 
unique, creative and unrepeatable form.  
We have to examine the confusive more accurately: even when it is absorbed by the model 
to the point that there is a complete or almost complete loss of self, the subject incurs a debt 
of gratitude towards the model which has allowed the person to overcome him or herself, to 
go beyond the boundaries of a mediocre existence.  What would Emma’s life have been like if 
she had continued to be Charles Bovary’s faithful wife? How often would she have imagined 
seeing the bitterness of her existence served up on her plate?8 So the confusive is an oppor-
tunity for a superior life, although it involves a permanent threat to one’s own individuality. 
Having said this though, there is no intention to legitimize every decision to adopt mimetic 
behaviour: what then is the difference between Emma’s influencers and those who today 
 
8 “Mais c’était surtout aux heures des repas qu’elle n’en pouvait plus, danc cette petite salle au rez-de-
chaussée, avec le poêle qui fumait, la porte qui criait, les murs qui suintaient, les pavés humides; toute 
l’amertume de l’existence lui semblait servie sur son assiette, et, à la fumée du bouilli, il montait du fond 
de son âme comme d’autres bouffées d’affadissement. Charles était long à manger; elle grignotait quel-
ques noisettes, ou bien, appuyée du coude, s’amusait, avec la pointe de son couteau, à faire des raies sur 
la toile cirée” (Flaubert, Madame Bovary 67). “It was at meal-times that her endurance was strained to the 
furthest, in that little ground-floor living-room with its smoking stove, squeaking door, running walls 
and damp flagstones. She seemed to have all the bitterness of life served up on her plate; the steam 
from the stew conjured up like fumes of nausea from the depths of her soul. Charles was a slow eater. 
She used to nibble a few nuts, or lean her elbow on the table and beguile the time by tracing little lines 
on the oil-cloth with the tip of her knife” (Flaubert, Madame Bovary. Translated by Alan Russell, 79). This 
passage is quoted and commented on by Erich Auerbach (Mimesis). 
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trivialize women’s existence? Is it not perhaps the desire for the absolute, the vocation for an 
otherness that can cross stereotypes? Could it not be that the fascination of Flaubert’s won-
derful character depends on the conflict between slavery to stereotypes and a strength that 
does not allow oneself to be imprisoned by them? 
So, we must avoid all easy schematizations: the theory must remain ductile, the concepts 
must not aim at a taxonomic, but rather a heuristic outcome.  
I started by examining the relations between x and alter, considering the relationships be-
tween a subject and a model, that is the relationships between two identities: the first is deter-
mined by the relationship with the second. This is what a dividing and conjunctive relationship is: an 
entity denies coincidence with itself thanks to a relationship with another entity that lets itself 
be modelled by to different extents and into different forms. This is the most evident mode 
of the desire to be, and it is also the one that more clearly reveals the existence of a non-rigid 
logic. Identification is a fundamental process for the formation of identity in human beings: 
and yet, the logic that began with Aristotle, and which has become the modern, formal logic, 
is trapped in separative relations. Its very principles forbid it from thinking of the processes 
by which we become what we are.  It resembles—taking up Wittgenstein’s metaphor—a fly 
trapped in a fly-bottle that constantly tries to find a way out and only bangs against the side. 
We could say that the separative logic is able to conceive of identity in the mode of coinci-
dence, and so maintains its validity with respect to at least a part—perhaps the greatest part—
of the processes of which our identity consists. It is true: rigid logic corresponds to our rigidity, 
to the effects of becoming rigid. It is not false, but fallacious. A fallacy is not a banal mistake, 
but it is a deformation, a reduction, a distortion. It would be odd if separative logic had been 
able to dominate for so many centuries and even today, if it were simply wrong.  
Shortly before, the preponderance of the rigid in intellectual processes was posited. How-
ever, identity does not depend only on intellectual processes, but also on the desire to be; there-
fore, separative relations are perhaps the most numerous from the point of view of statistics 
as they include the countless contacts that occur in daily life even between strangers (relations 
between customers in shops, people who get on the same train, etc.), but they are not the most 
important or decisive. Their importance seems greater if we consider the lives of adults, in 
other words of people who seem to have completed the process of formation, and who very 
often content themselves with what they have become. Yet every adult has lived in the condi-
tion of an x forced to look for his own form in otherness: the possibility that he has lost all 
strength to overcome does not mean to say that he has never experienced it at least once (in 
actual fact, it is experienced at least a certain number of times, even in the case of the simplest 
human identities). 
The more dynamic societies become, the more the number and importance of surpassing 
or conjunctive relations become. It is not just by chance that this type of relation has increased 
in the bourgeois society, the one in which “all that is solid melts into the air” (Marx and Engels 
ch. 1 par. 18); and it is not just a fluke that the coming-of-age novel, the Bildungsroman, came into 
being and developed in modern times. Not only this: the coming-of-age novel may be considered 
“the essence” of the novel, that is the construction method that best expresses its potentialities. 
The protagonists of epic poetry were almost always adults and, therefore, (with some excep-
tions) characters who were already generally stabilized. They had already overcome the 
“shadow line,” to quote one of Conrad’s tales. However, anyone who is tempted to extend 
this consideration to the heroes of tragedy, who from a biographical point of view are adults, 
risks misunderstanding completely the nature of the tragic: in fact, the tragic hero is an indi-
vidual who is strongly destabilized by an event that disrupts his way of life, and forces him to 
make a decision that is so great and heavy that he will be crushed by it. 
The event that triggers the tragic narration is always traumatic: the reply of the oracle (“You 
will kill your father and marry your mother”) to Oedipus’ question; Jason’s repudiation which 
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inflicts an intolerable wound on Medea; Creonte’s decree that forbids the burial of Polynices 
and condemns him to a “second death,” that of being denied the ritual of mourning and being 
cancelled from men’s memories, etc.. It is the appearance of a figure from beyond the grave 
who reveals a terrible event in the case of Hamlet: a relatively young hero, whose identity is 
shaken, knocked “out of joint,” by this revelation. In fact, it is not the world in general, but 
Hamlet’s being that is disrupted, and which must find a form again.  
On this occasion, I cannot dwell on a phenomenology of the traumatic event, but it is 
worth highlighting the possibility that it comes from within, that is to say from the character’s 
psyche: is this not perhaps the case of Jim in Conrad’s novel when he abandons his ship in 
distress? 
 
 
5. The Identity of the Tragic Hero 
Why does the modern novel begin with Don Quixote? At first glance, the work by Cervantes 
cannot be considered a coming-of-age novel, as the protagonist is anything but young. However, 
the biographical age is less important than it might seem from a purely descriptive point of 
view: in this case, the trauma is represented by the reading of some books; the character’s mind 
is disrupted, he becomes a limit-surpassing character in the sense defined up until now. He is 
sucked into otherness, and thus shaped according to a confusive style. Don Quixote again 
becomes an x, he returns to the condition of someone lacking form and can only find it outside 
himself. 
In Cervantes, an individual x frees himself of his coincidence with himself (a hidalgo, etc.), 
he discards it, he chooses the path of non-coincidence, but to emerge in a no less rigid identity 
than the one he wanted to escape from—and this is what gives rise to the comedy of the novel. 
In any case, alter acts as a model. As we said shortly before, the relationship with a model 
represents only one of the ways of overcoming oneself. At other times, the drive to exceed 
one’s own limits derives from an overabundance of life: we do not find, at least not explicitly, 
a model for Ulysses or for Faust. We do not even find it in the case of the tragic character; 
nevertheless, his vocation to go beyond is undeniable. He violates the condition of averageness, 
in which all or almost all the other characters live, and his self-same averageness, that is the 
possibility to live in the socially assigned spaces, in the foreseen roles.9 Oedipus could have 
ignored the insult of a playmate, and continued to live as the son of the Corinthian sovereigns; 
Medea could have resigned herself to her condition of being shunned, and not have committed 
the terrible crime, which the woman deems “necessary”—which does not mean obligatory;10 
Antigone could have shared Ismene’s prudent choice. In the tragic character’s decision there 
is an excess, an arrogance that pushes him or her simultaneously in opposite directions. There-
fore, the schematic diagram of his or her identity in fig. 1 seems plausible.11 
By joining the upper and the lower vertexes to each other, the arrows indicate a relationship 
between correlatives, in other words between two opposites that involve each other reciprocally. 
Let us take the case of Oedipus: he is judged by his fellow citizens to be “the first amongst 
men” as he freed Thebes from the “singing bitch”; he is defined as the “best among mortals,” 
the only one who can cure the city of the disease that has assailed it. Oedipus is a hero of 
intelligence, and his is an intelligence that loves to challenge enigmas. At the same time, he 
 
9 I take up this notion from Heidegger, who in Being and Time refers to it with the term Durchschnittlichkeit 
(we can also translate it as “mean condition”). 
10 “ἀλλ΄ εἶ΄ ὁπλίζου͵ καρδία. τί μέλλομεν τὰ δεινὰ κἀναγκαῖα μὴ πράσσειν κακά”; (Nay, steel thyself my 
heart. Why linger we as not to do that horrendous yet necessary action? (Euripides, Medea 1242–43; the 
translation has been modified). 
11 For this scheme, see Bottiroli, Liberatore e incatenato (in particular, 65–67). 
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bears the responsibility for two 
terrible sins, parricide and incest; 
thus, he is the worst of men, a 
blemish for his city, and he himself 
will ask to be expelled from 
Thebes. Oedipus is a relationship be-
tween extremes, the link between two 
overcomings. All this should appear 
indisputable, and offer a first con-
firmation of the pertinence and 
heuristic value of the diagram pre-
sented here. Some perplexity may 
arise with regard to the simultane-
ousness of the two movements be-
yond averageness: it could be as-
serted that Oedipus first becomes 
the best among mortals by beating 
the Sphinx, and only later, after 
discovering his faults and Jocasta’s 
suicide, does he become the most wretched of all.  On closer inspection, we can see that all 
his actions are linked together; therefore, as Freud observed, the fact that  Oedipus takes re-
sponsibility even for the deeds he committed unwittingly appears convincing for the reader 
(or spectator); and this, undoubtedly, derives from Sophocles’ artistic choice, which, in Oedipus 
Rex, does not present a linear narration of the facts, but involves us in a great flashback. Thus, 
the two sides of Oedipus show a non-contingent weld. 
It is worth noting that this interpretation is more Nietzschean than Freudian, as it attributes 
the same significance to Oedipus’ excesses, to the overabundance of his intellectual talent that 
drives him to the upper vertex as the transgressions that restrict him to the lower vertex (Nie-
tzsche, The Birth of Tragedy ch. 9)—at least in this work, because Oedipus at Colonus offers a 
completely extramoral vision of the character who becomes a beneficial force for the city that 
welcomes him. So, the desire to be in Oedipus is not only the desire to be the father. 
 
 
6. Being the Object of Desire 
Let us return to Freud and the distinctions made in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. 
There are two possible types of identification involved in the relationship between two indi-
viduals: the first type—which we discussed in section 4—consists in the desire to be a model 
(or a model/rival), the second in the desire to be an object. This possibility appears to be more 
complex, or at least more convoluted, than the first: shouldn’t the desired object be the aim 
only of the desire to have?  This, however, is not the case in love. Not only is object-libido, 
what Freud termed as “investment in objects,” directed towards the loved one, that is to say 
the desire to have, but also a power to surpass: in love the investment in objects and identifi-
cation intertwine (and reinforce each other reciprocally) (Freud, “Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego” ch. 8). 
The processes of identification confirm the plasticity of drives to no lesser degree than 
investments in objects. When Freud dismantles the drive into 4 factors (pressure, source, ob-
ject, aim), he affirms that the object is the most variable element or factor (Freud, “Instincts 
and Their Vicissitudes” 122): but, in the first essay of Metapsychology, the importance and the 
role of identification have not yet been fully recognized. However, Freud is now beginning to 
understand the relevance of this process, so much so that in the last meta psychological essay, 
Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of the tragic character’s 
identity. 
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“Mourning and melancholia,” identification has leapt to the fore. It will be melancholy that 
offers the strongest proof for the theory by which love entwines the desire to be with the 
desire to have: that which can remain hidden in happy love emerges with devastating effects 
in unhappy love. In love, the subject has ceded a considerable part of his or her narcissism to 
the beloved: this gift, which is so rash, has no consequence (and the subject does not neces-
sarily have any perception of it) until such time as it is reciprocated. Yet, if the subject is aban-
doned, he must realize that his loss does not begin beyond his boundaries, but within them: 
he has lost a part of himself. Freud’s magnificent expression, “the shadow of the object fell 
upon the ego” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 249), indicates the irruption of a void in the 
subject’s psyche. It is as if “a foreign territory had opened up internally,” to return to the 
expression with which Freud refers to the unconscious (“New Introductory Lectures On Psy-
cho-Analysis” 57). Yet there is a great difference between the unconscious and the lost object: 
the unconscious, after all, includes energies and possibilities that belong to the subject, desires 
that he can reconquer by means of interpretation, so, to a certain extent the unconscious con-
tinues to uphold him and to drive him forwards; on the contrary, the lost object does not play 
any beneficial role by itself; it may become an opportunity to redefine oneself only in a remote 
time and it is quite difficult to work through. 
Nonetheless, as we have just said, identification offers a confirmation, perhaps the most 
important, of the plasticity of human beings. No other species seems to possess this ductility, 
in the possibilities that it offers. Cet être flexible is characterized not only by a minor flexibility, 
which is adaptive, applicative, capable of exploiting contexts, of effortlessly changing and re-
placing objects, but also a major flexibility, thanks to which it can overcome the limits of its 
own identity. In the major flexibility we have to recognize the idion of the human condition.12 
We are beings capable of overcoming, of not coinciding with ourselves, thanks to the desire 
to be.  
Let’s return to love and melancholy. The loss of a beloved one can lead to devastating 
consequences: and everything begins the moment the subject starts to become the object of 
desire. We can lose someone in various ways, through death or a separation that is too pro-
longed and unbearable: Ophelia loses Hamlet when she believes he has been torn apart by 
madness. She describes him in the following terms to Polonius: 
 
My lord, as I was sewing in my closet, 
Lord Hamlet with his doublet all unbraced, 
No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled, 
Ungartered, and down-gyvèd to his ancle, 
Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other, 
And with a look so piteous in purport 
As if he had been loosèd out of hell 
To speak of horrors - he comes before me (II.1.76–83). 
 
Hamlet undoubtedly represents an image of perfection, an ideal Ego, a narcissistic imago 
for Ophelia: and as she has identified herself with Hamlet, being in love with him Ophelia is 
destined to suffer the same disintegration. 
 
 
7. Brief Summary: Three Theorems of the Modal Revolution 
What is Hamlet’s desire? The question was raised at the beginning of this investigation: a ques-
tion that cannot be posed ingenuously, because desire is one of the most enigmatic 
 
12 The idion is an Aristotelian concept: it indicates a universality that differs from essence. 
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characteristics of the entity that we ourselves are. I have tried to define the essential features 
of ontology and the logic of desire from the perspective of the modal revolution that for me 
represents the most articulate and fruitful possibility of philosophical intelligence, but also the 
one addressed to the analysis of works of art.  
The first theorem (to use the language of Spinoza) of the modal revolution may be formu-
lated thus: being is modus, and the modus is conflict, polemos. More explicitly, being always gives 
itself in modes of being.13 
This not only implies a movement of Copernican rotation, which involves making all the 
factual categories rotate around the modal ones, as indicated by the classic doctrine of modal-
ities, but also the introduction of new categories that must be placed in the position of com-
mand:  
 
rigid – flexible 
undivided – divided 
dense – articulate 
 
 
possible – impossible 
existent (actual) – inexistent 
necessary – contingent 
 
The new modal categories dominate over those of the classical theory, “they are higher 
up,” and as a result of this superior position, they modify the meaning of the old categories. 
The possibility is no longer simply “the not yet actual and not always necessary”: it becomes a 
conflictual space where the inferior (or reactive) possibilities fight the superior (or active) pos-
sibilities. It is power, but not simply production, as Deleuze would have it in the wake of Berg-
son. Thanks to the new theory of modalities, we are able to understand how Bergson’s and 
Deleuze’s proposal to replace “possible-actual” with “virtual/actual” is a small reform and a 
great mystification. 
 Bergson deplored the fact that possibility could be understood only in its logical meaning, 
as “non- impossibility”; and, above all, he rebelled against the idea that the field of possibles 
was already articulate (a paradigmatic example: “tomorrow it will rain or it won’t rain”), and 
so he did not admit the emergence of the unpredictable. But his emphasizing of the possible 
as superior to the actual, his idea of “virtual” as that which overcomes its accomplishments, is 
commendable but it remains a small reform: in fact, it exhausts itself in the old doctrine, and 
in its oppositional pairs. Bergson proposes an energetist interpretation of the modal space, which 
means: (i) the possible/virtual flows into the actual, but overflows, returns to itself to gain 
strength; (ii) the area of the necessary is eliminated; (iii) the impetus of the possible (l’élan vital) 
expresses itself mainly in the proliferation of the multiple.  
Instead, in the perspective I have defined and outlined in the diagram above, the necessity 
is not eliminated, but radically changes its meaning and its function: it selects the superior 
possibilities that oppose the contingent ones. In this way Hamlet’s inertia—we can say in ad-
vance—may be interpreted not simply as a paralysis, but rather as a search for his superior 
 
13 In this section, I try to point out the theses and results of La ragione flessibile. I consider my text to be 
like a logical-ontological Tractatus, even though it is presented in the form of an essay. It would have 
been rather naive and inappropriate for the spirit of the time to adopt an overly systematic form of 
presentation; furthermore, it would have led to an abandonment, even if partial, of the flexibility inspir-
ing my book, with the consequent opportunities for further investigations. Another subheading could 
be added to the one that I have chosen, “Modes of Being and Styles of Thought,” and that would be: 
“Ontology More Strategico Demonstrata.” 
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possibilities. Furthermore, we need to underline the difference between an overflowing of energies and the search 
for the non-coincidence. We should not allow ourselves to be hypnotized by deceptive similarities, 
that is to say by the primacy of becoming, and by the metamorphic tension: the processes are 
quite different. The energetist débordement is perfectly compatible with a conception of the un-
divided subject, who transforms himself from the “proprietary” and mereological point of 
view, but never enters the relational and modal field, as we are defining it.  He remains a subject 
of coincidence, even if it is in the most dynamic meaning possible. Nietzschean Überwindung is 
another thing. 
The second theorem of the modal revolution affirms the pluralism and the conflict also in 
the dimension of the logic: the conjunctive logics oppose the disjunctive (or separative) logics. On closer 
inspection, we are dealing with two families, the second of which is more varied and complex 
than the first, insofar as it immediately demands the distinction between the distinctive and 
the confusive style. The link between logic and ontology should be underlined: as in every 
relationship between correlatives, the opposites can paralyze or confirm each other dogmati-
cally, or destabilize and intensify each other in their reciprocity. In this way, a separative logic 
will offer (or will believe it offers) a final confirmation to ontology of the objective presence 
(Vorhandenheit), to ontology reduced to the ontic, to the ontology of entities that coincide with 
themselves). On the contrary, a conjunctive and therefore dividing logic (in the version of flexibility) will 
indicate the paths of non-coincidence. 
The non of  non-coincidence, that does not get bogged down in alter, is the non of the will 
to power: it is more affirmative than any (simple) affirmation. 
We are able to add a third theorem, regarding desire. Firstly, desire also gives itself in two 
different ways, splitting into desire to be and desire to have. Both, undoubtedly, concern the identity 
of the subject, but from this point of view the desire to be is more important. We must counter 
the tendency to subordinate it to the desire to have. The desire to be must be understood in 
the entirety of its possibilities; it implies processes of “othering”: “Je est un autre.” Following 
Freud, we need to distinguish the relationships of x with alter, as model/rival, and as object. 
But we also need to consider a possibility that has escaped psychoanalysis and which is exem-
plified by the tragic hero: the overcoming of averageness and the movement towards two 
extremes which are linked to each other. 
 
 
8. The Desire to Be and Psychoanalysis 
It is not only for this reason that in psychoanalysis the ontology of desire proves to be  inade-
quate and open to criticism. Let’s start by examining the position of Freud, whom we have 
acknowledged to be the first to have defined in a precise way the theory of identity as being 
equivalent to processes of identification. There is no need to reaffirm the exceptional im-
portance, also from a philosophical point of view, of  “Group Psychology and the Analysis of 
the Ego” (1921). Unfortunately, Freud does not seem to have realized the importance of his 
achievement; in fact, one year later, in “The Ego and the Id,” he went back to proposing a 
mereological concept of the subject; but Freud’s greatest limitation consists in having subor-
dinated the desire to be to the desire to have, as can easily be verified if we examine the Oedi-
pus complex. 
Here we see the two modes of desire united: the desire to be the father, in the sense of 
rivalry which aims at substitution, and the desire to possess the incestuous object. The Freud-
ian reading of Sophocles’ Oedipus rex confirms this nexus of subordination: even if uncon-
sciously, parricide is committed in relation to the incest, consequently the Greek hero’s sense 
of guilt in not refusing to consider himself responsible for his actions is psychologically right. 
Freud adds that, being more fortunate than Oedipus, we limit ourselves to desiring what he 
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has done (Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams). So, the complex bearing the name of the Greek 
character seems to be hinged on the “triangulation of having,” what we could call: 
 
the desiring subject – the Law and its prohibition - the desired and prohibited object. 
 
Overcoming the Oedipus complex, which is necessary if the individual is to integrate so-
cially, requires the acceptance of the law, and the renouncement of the object of desire: the 
desire to have runs along the path of substitutions, which includes renouncing to be the father 
(if to be = to replace) and access to substitutive objects (other people, when the subject enters 
adulthood). It should, therefore, be noted how the Oedipus complex and the triangulation of 
having inevitably suggest a substitutive conception. 
It is a known fact that Lacan reinterpreted the Freudian Oedipus to the point of overturn-
ing it, insofar as it is the mother who finds herself in the position of the desiring subject: what 
does a woman want—as only a mother or as a woman in general? She desires what she lacks. 
The object of such a lack is shown by Lacan to be the Phallus: it follows that the first funda-
mental desire for the child will be that of being the mother’s Phallus. Thus, the desire to be 
finds its first mode of expression. As far as the paternal role is concerned, it continues to be 
exercised in the field of the Law, but not as a prohibition or threat addressed to the desire of 
the boy, but rather as protection for he who risk being absorbed, swallowed by a maternal will 
that is uncontrollable in its intensity. 
At this point, we need to ask ourselves whether Lacan’s overturning of the Oedipus com-
plex has called into question the triangulation of having, or whether it has represented it in a  
wider and more precise form: and also more developed, because the space of the law is referred 
to with a name, the Symbolic, that comprises the whole culture, the society with its codes, 
including language. Such developments are undeniable, and do not concern only the Oedipus 
complex. 
Thanks to Lacan, the relational concept of identity, launched by Freud, becomes a modal 
concept: what are, in fact, the three registers if not modes of experience, modes of being and, in 
the case of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, modes of thinking and looking? And again: the 
three registers are modes of the relationship between x and alter. In the Imaginary, the desire to be 
manifests itself in the highest degree of confusedness: the Ego is sucked in, inhaled by the 
ideal Ego, whether it wants it or not. In a wide range of fluctuations, we find Narcissus at one 
extreme, but also Dorian Gray, and at the other extreme Woody Allen’s Zelig (1983), the 
human chameleon, who cannot help modelling himself on another, on any other with whom 
he comes into contact at any given moment. 
As far as the Real is concerned, it represents an even more dissolutivea aim, because a 
subject who addresses the desire to be towards the Real chooses the annihilation of self. Once 
again, we have a wide range of fluctuations and variations, from the absolute and unknown 
form, without properties, for example the Dame in courtly love, to the amorphous. And the 
Symbolic? 
Only the Symbolic allows an individual to reach the fullness of his subjectivity and to gain 
access to the potentialities of his desire: because only in the Symbolic will he be able to find 
the tools for interpreting it.  And faithfulness to one’s own desire—according to Lacan, the 
only precept of psychoanalytical ethics—will remain an incomprehensible goal if the link with 
interpretation is broken. However, we must not think that interpretation can lead desire to 
absolute transparency! Interpretation is an activity of articulation and analysis, that disentwines: 
it opens up paths. Interpretation descends from Metis, and from Poros. Interpreting is decid-
ing in the state of exception, when the will and the intellect are encumbered by dark clouds.  
Anyone who knows Lacan realizes that this concept of interpretation is almost entirely 
missing from his work: this absence should be questioned. Why is there this gap in the 
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Symbolic? At first glance, the Lacanian Symbolic seems to be like a great city, where all lan-
guages are spoken and where all the Culture is hosted insofar as it differs from Nature. This is 
certainly the case. And yet, if it is examined more carefully, the city seems to shrink to just one 
district, that of the Law, or to a series of districts that are too similar to each other. We realize 
that the languages are reduced to codes, and that the functioning of the language is governed 
by the “code/message” dialectic. In other words, in the Lacanian Symbolic, rigidity dominates: 
the minor flexibility is certainly there, but not the major one. The Lacanian Symbolic is an 
undivided register: this is the great limitation, the great mistake, because THE language does not 
exist, and it gives itself only in its own ways, that is styles: “logos is polemos,” Heidegger would 
say, it is the space in which the styles of thought differentiate, entwine and fight with each 
other.  
Objection will be made to the fact that a bar has been drawn through the Big Other: does 
this not perhaps indicate a division? The answer is no. The bar  indicates the incompleteness 
of the Other, the inexistence of metalanguage, the theory by which the Other of the Other 
does not exist, but this does not lead to a polemological view of language or the downsizing of 
the “code/message.” Let us try to clarify this point which is of fundamental importance.  
 
 
9. The Greatest Fallacy: the Substitutive Symbolic 
Lacan’s research was blocked by a true and proper epistemological obstacle, to use Bachelard’s 
terminology. And the root of this obstacle should be recognized in the poor combination 
between the primacy of the Law in the Oedipus complex and that of the code in modern 
linguistics: in both cases, it is easy to see how rigidity exerts conditioning. Another factor of 
inflexibility is Lacan’s subjection to disjunctive logics.   
Lacan’s encounter with modern linguistics produced extremely innovative outcomes and, 
in particular, in the 1950s, the thesis according to which the unconscious is structured like a 
language. In this way, the centrality of the word, of the linguistic medium, found new purposes 
in the relationship between analyst and patient (or better: analysand). The diagnosis was also 
able to organize itself with greater precision: psychosis has been defined as the foreclosure of 
a fundamental signifier, the Name-of-the-Father. Was Lacan a structuralist? In part yes, and 
he had the ability to interpret some aspects of structuralism creatively: however, the main me-
diator of his relationship with modern linguistics was Roman Jakobson, a scholar whose pro-
posals are today, to a large extent, outdated. Unfortunately, Jakobson fostered a regression 
compared with Saussure, who understood the langue not only to be a set of collective habits 
(basically what was called code), but as a field of virtuality. Starting from the diagram of the two 
fluxes, and from the concept of articulation (“language might be called the domain of articu-
lations”; Saussure 112), it would have been possible to develop a theory of divided language. 
In what way? By thinking of the paradigmatic axis not as a “filing cabinet of prefabricated rep-
resentations” (Jakobson 97), and therefore the dimension of the code, but rather as the fissure 
from which different styles arise, just one of which is the separative. I have presented this 
concept, which I have called rain of styles, elsewhere.14 Fig. 2 offers a graphic representation of 
the concept. 
The separative, the distinctive (flexible rationality) and the confusive differentiate that field 
of possibilities that is language. Each text in a natural language is at least two styles woven 
together. 
For Jakobson, on the other hand, the paradigmatic axis is structured only by the separative, 
which attributes to each sign an identity that tends to be rigid; and it contains a set of signs, 
 
14 See Bottiroli, La ragione flessibile 261. I take the liberty of also referring to Bottiroli, What is alive and 
what is dead in Jakobson. From codes to styles. 
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from which the speaker choses each time to form a syntagma. The paradigmatic axis is also 
defined as the axis of substitutions because, according to requirements and to contexts, a term 
will be substituted with a term used in another context, or even just a moment before. Let us 
complete the picture: Jakobson attempts to reduce the rhetorical mechanisms drastically by 
coupling the metaphor and metonymy with the two Saussurian axes, placing the metaphor on 
the paradigmatic axis and metonymy on the syntagmatic axis. Why ever should he do that? For 
quite a banal reason, because in so doing he does nothing more than take up the traditional 
definitions of these two mechanisms; as the metaphor has been defined, since the time of 
Aristotle, as the substitution of one word with another on the basis of a nexus of similarity, he 
places it on the paradigmatic axis. In this way, though, without realizing it Jakobson reproposes 
the old substitutive concept of the metaphor, which is almost completely deprived of value 
(and reserved only for simple, stereotyped cases) by Max Black, in an article of paramount 
importance published in 1954, at the same time as the work of the Russian linguist. Today, the 
substitutive conception of the metaphor appears to be completely obsolete and unacceptable.15 
Unfortunately, Lacan endorsed it. Let us now see what disastrous effects it had on his research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lacan derives the substitutive point of view from Jakobson and extends it to the Symbolic 
in its  entirety: so Culture seems to be the substitute of Nature, and this relationship can be 
written as a fraction in which the numerator takes over the denominator; yet, the way in which 
substitutions are written is repeated many times; we will give just a few examples: 
 
Culture   Name-of-the-Father  Language 
-----    ------------------    ----- 
Nature   Desire of the mother  Jouissance 
 
In the lectures presented by Jacques-Alain Miller, this procedure even becomes obsessive. 
The substitutive conception appeared plausible to describe access to the Symbolic and the 
loss of enjoyment that follows as a result. Undoubtedly, submitting to the law implies a renun-
ciation. But is the Symbolic only, or essentially, the Law? Lacan favoured a reduction, which 
for his followers has become a dogma. So Miller reached the point of saying “The Law of the 
Name-of-the-Father is basically nothing more than the law of language.” More precisely, the 
Law “says no, . . . says no because the field of language consists of this no” (Miller 130). 
This reductionism is truly unacceptable: first and foremost, because Miller seems to have 
completely forgotten the lesson of structuralism according to which language consists of neg-
ative-differential relationships. Consequently, language does not say no; language says “non,” 
and the non is the activity of articulation.  
 
15 This does not imply that the cognitivism developed by Black’s intuition is without criticism. 
Fig. 2. The rain of styles. 
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But it is not enough to rediscover the most fruitful lesson of structuralism, in which (as we 
have just seen) language remains undivided since the point of view of the code has made the 
dimension of the virtualities rigid. With what ingenuity and nonchalance does the same Lacan 
talk about “laws of language”! What are these laws? The need to perform two operations, the 
selection on the paradigmatic axis and the combination on the syntagmatic one, for each lin-
guistic act? Was it necessary to wait for the genius of Saussure to proclaim this triviality? There 
are certainly some restraints that organize the activity of the speaker, for example the con-
striction of linearity: two sounds cannot be pronounced at the same time (see Saussure 70). 
But these restraints have quite a weak similarity with the laws, in the sense that they are for-
mulated by science. So, let’s abandon a sterile over-emphasis, and dedicate our research to the 
possibilities of language, as shown in an inaugural way by the rain of styles. 
Language says “non.” Between the styles of thought, there are relationships of alternation, 
interweaving and combat. None of them can absorb the others or claim possession of their 
potentialities, although the Symbolic is the most complex: pluralism is irrepressible and fecund. 
This perspective induces us to overcome the substitutive conception of the Symbolic, and its 
punitive theorems. In fact, two theses derive from the substitutive concept: (a) the word kills 
the Thing; (b) the signifier castrates. 
Let’s start from the second thesis: the signifier cuts (and transforms), and does not necessarily 
castrate. It cuts in different ways as it can articulate without actually cutting. But, even when it 
cuts, it can act with effects of liberation and expansion. The non that cuts the bond of subor-
dination between language and referent creates the autonomy of the language in relation with 
the actuality. However, the most fruitful and creative action of the non consists in the split 
between different styles, between different logics: in the production of the “non-coincidence” 
of a being with itself. 
We will return to this later. For now, we must insist with the criticisms against  a substitutive 
and punitive vision of language, which is often summarized in the thesis according to which 
language is allegedly a trauma. If this is the case, it should be specified: felix trauma, as its eman-
cipatory potentialities are far superior to the repressive effects. Does language kill the Thing? 
This thesis too must be examined carefully, and not repeated as if it were a mantra.  
First of all, we need to evaluate the two possible ways of writing this thesis, of Hegelian 
derivation: does language kill the Thing or does it kill things? In an essay of 1948, Blanchot 
quotes a passage from  Hegel: “Adam’s first act, which made him master of the animals, was 
to give them names, that is he annihilated them in their existence (as existing creatures)” 
(Blanchot, “Literature and the right to death” 323). Blanchot adds: “Hegel means that from 
that moment on the cat ceased to be a uniquely real cat and became an idea as well” (323). The 
rise of language therefore requires and determines, “a sort of immense hecatomb, a preliminary 
flood plunging all of creation into a total sea. God had created living things, but man had to 
annihilate them. Not until then did they take on meaning for him, and he in turn created them 
out of the death into which they had disappeared” (323). This was Hegel’s thesis: the word 
kills the thing. This is undoubtedly a counter-intuitive, disconcerting thesis, which must be 
clarified: and, at least initially, if we clarify it, we will downsize its dramatic nature. 
For Hegel every word, as a conveyor of a concept, is inevitably placed on the side of the 
Universal: by saying “cat” I name the species, not a particular cat; I evoke a concept, not a 
perception.  Blanchot observes: “the word, always general, has always failed to capture what it 
names” (The infinite conversation 34). With undeniable reference to this conception, Lacan will 
write: “Thus the symbol first manifests itself as the killing of the thing” (“The Function and 
Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” 262). However, it seems that the tragic pa-
thos with which Hegel describes the passage from nature to culture can be considerably down-
sized; in fact, Blanchot specifies: “Certainly my language does not kill anyone” (93). Let’s now 
proceed along the Hegelian line of thought, to understand it better. It is doubtful whether the 
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Hegelian death is a true death. Language is loss as it can define things only in their “ideality,” 
in their abstraction, suppressing the particularities of the experience, the distinguishing fea-
tures; but it is also restoration, resurrection. Luckily, my cat is not killed by the word “cat”: it is 
annihilated (that is disowned) in its specific existence, but restored in the form of the concept, 
of the meaning. Things die, but then rise again in the life of the spirit. This is why Hegelian 
death is not a true death, rather an “interiorized” death, which acts on behalf of that transpo-
sition that Hegel calls Aufhebung: so the word is “life that tolerates death and conserves itself 
in it” (Blanchot 98-99). 
In an even further de-emphasized form, the thesis of loss is today proposed by cognitivism: 
language purportedly does not have such a fine grain as perception—which is certainly true if 
language is understood principally as lexis, as labelling. But was this vision of language not 
rejected a long time ago thanks to Saussure, Wittgenstein, and other authors? Isn’t literature 
perhaps the greatest denial of the thesis of an inevitable impoverishment? Let’s consider an 
example: 
 
There was a rose, a single remaining rose. Through the sad, dead days of late summer it had 
continued to bloom, and now though persimmons had long swung their miniature suns among 
the caterpillar-festooned branches, and gum and maple and hickory had flaunted two gold and 
scarlet weeks, and the grass, where grandfathers of grasshoppers squatted sluggishly like sullen 
octogenarians, had been penciled twice delicately with frost, and the sunny noons were scented 
with sassafras, it still bloomed – overripe now, and a little gallantly blowsy, like a fading burlesque 
star. Miss Jenny worked in a sweater these days, and her trowel glinted in her earthy glove. 
 “It’s like some women I’ve known,” she said. “It just don’t know how to give up gracefully and 
be a grandmamma.” (Faulkner 224–25) 
 
Would it have been possible to achieve the perception suggested in these few lines without 
language? Definitely not. More importantly, it would be impossible to see things in the way 
they are shown in more intensely metaphoric descriptions than this, and which only linguistic 
elaboration is able to create. Therefore, language is not only castration, loss of enjoyment, but 
an opening up to new possibilities of knowledge and enjoyment. However, it has to be recog-
nized as being a field of agonistic articulations.  
It is from this perspective that we can also assess the other writing of the Hegelian thesis: 
language kills the Thing, that is the drive, the real. The incandescence of drive is tempered by 
language, understood here more than ever as being equivalent to Law. Lacan talks about a 
lethal action of the signifier: but shouldn’t we rather distinguish different possible actions? It 
must be borne in mind, however, that everything depends on the starting point or on the initial 
definition: if the drive is an impulse destined for an autistic circuit, if it is a figure of the One, 
as shown by the image of a mouth trying to kiss itself, then the signifier seems to be able to 
act only as a dampener or interruption. Or like a dam that deviates the flow in another direc-
tion, in this case towards otherness. And even if processes of potentially creative sublimation 
can be generated by deviating the drive in another direction, the strength of the Trieb continues 
to appear as a danger, and like an excess that has to be tamed. This view is not entirely wrong. 
Nevertheless, it is only partial, incomplete, unilateral: it hides a more complete vision, which 
Freud announced several times, when he underlined the plasticity of drives. On closer inspec-
tion, the drive reunites opposing determinations: it is an incentive to repetition and so to cir-
cularity and to fixation; it is an incredibly adhesive force. One of the most striking images of 
this adhesion is the stubbornness with which Narcissus, after his death, on the banks of the 
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river Styx, continues to be attracted hypnotically by his reflection.16 At the same time though, 
drive is the most plastic of the forces, it is what fuels incessantly the flexibility of human beings. 
Without it, the tendency to coincide with oneself would impose itself without encountering  
any obstacles. 
Therefore, the logic-ontologic conflict between coincidence and non-coincidence finds its 
arché, its beginning and its engine, in the duplicity of the Trieb. So, in the drive, we must know 
how to discern two movements of equal importance: on the one hand, it revolves around the 
object, it closes circularly on itself; on the other, drive sneaks into the articulations of the 
signifier, into its narrow passageways, its labyrinths, the roads that only it can open and reveal. 
In fact, if it does not enter the Symbolic, if it does not lubricate its rigidity, if it does not shake 
the entanglements of the signifiers, it remains a sterile activity. Drive needs the signifier in 
order not to be deprived of its plasticity, in order not to pour itself into the rigidity of the One 
or of the Multiple. On the contrary, the signifier should not perform an action that is almost 
entirely defensive if it wants to avoid taking on only rigid forms. We should bear in mind 
Nietzsche’s description in The Birth of Tragedy: when the Greeks decide to oppose the Apollo-
nian, like a head of Medusa, to the barbaric Dionysian, the result is Doric art that eternalizes 
“an attitude of majestic rejection” (20). However, before becoming “Socratized,” this popula-
tion was able to reconcile the two divinities of art: it was able to create the tragedy before the 
separative logic, and a sculpture in which the forms become sinuous, abandoning the former 
rigidity. Therefore, the relationship between drive and the signifier can be expressed in differ-
ent ways. 
We need to move on from “the signifier” to the “modes of the signifier.” 
  
 
10. How a Metaphor Works—The Backwardness of Lacan and the La-
canian Followers 
Let’s return to the problem of the metaphor. This problem cannot be considered marginal, 
and not only because the old rhetorical figures have revealed their pertinence with regard to 
the processes of the unconscious, condensation and displacement: the unconscious structured 
like a language is the unconscious, at least of the metaphor and of the metonymy. Lacan en-
trusted the metaphor with a crucial role, that of introducing the subject in the register of the 
Symbolic. 
How does a metaphor work? According to a stereotype that is still widespread, the meta-
phor is a substitutive process, and its smallest dimension is a single word: the speaker could 
use a term that belongs to literal language and turn instead to an “inappropriate” term, that is 
a figure. He may want to (and could) say “Achilles is brave”; he prefers to say “Achilles is a 
lion.” For a long time, and even now, examples of this type are considered to be good examples 
of metaphors. This is quite grotesque: if we were asked to state a paradigmatic example of a 
“bird” we would say the eagle and not the hen. Nonetheless, the examples that are always 
offered by the substitutive conception of the metaphor correspond to the less representative 
case. 
Readers who know about the current debate regarding the metaphor will pardon me if I 
am about to refer to what everyone should know: those who are attached to the substitutive 
conception are today just Lacan’s followers and a few other scholars. In 1954, Max Black 
 
16 “Ille caput viridi fessum submisit in herba, / lumina nox clausit domini mirantia formam. / Tum 
quoque se, postquam est inferna sede receptus, / in Stygia spectabat aqua” (“At this he placed his head 
deep in cool grasses / while death shut fast the eyes that shone with light / at their own lustre. As he 
crossed the narrows /of darkest hell he saw the floating image / of his lost shade within the Stygian 
waters” (Ovid, Metamorphoses book III 502–05). 
To Be and Not to Be: Hamlet’s Identity 
Giovanni Bottiroli 
 Enthymema XXIII 2019 / 270 
published a seminal article which marked the way to a new conception: he called it interactional; 
this terminological choice is not entirely satisfactory, but it is the only element of his proposal 
that can be criticized. Thanks to Black, a turning point was reached of which I would like to 
mention the main features: 
(a) The minimum dimension of the metaphor is not the single word, but rather the utter-
ance. A paradigmatic example is: “man is a wolf.” 
(b) In order for there to be a metaphor, two terms are therefore needed, which Black calls 
focus and frame. In the example chosen, wolf is the focus (the metaphorizing) and man is the frame 
(the metaphorized). The metaphoric process consists in the action exerted by the focus on the 
frame. This action is focalizing insofar as it selects some traits of the metaphorized, leaving 
others in the background, sedating them so to speak; it emphasizes these traits, and thus re-
describes the starting term. In our example, the wolf picks out the aggressiveness and hazard-
ousness that belong to our species, leaving other characteristics (the inclination towards social 
relations, empathy) in the background, it emphasizes the traits that it exposes, and thus offers 
a re-description of the relationships among men. The social animal of a long-standing tradition 
transforms itself into a being that is dangerous for its own kind, which inspires Hobbes’ phi-
losophy: homo homini lupus. 
(c) Black calls the new viewpoint interactional. Interaction means a reciprocal action: un-
doubtedly, in this metaphor the man becomes wolf-like: it is the action exerted by the focus 
on the frame. As far as the inverse action is concerned, it is less perceivable: however, accord-
ing to Black, here the wolf becomes humanized to a certain extent. Whether we admit it or 
not, what really counts is the passage from the vertical conception (substitutive) to a horizontal 
conception (transformative). We are dealing with an irreversible conquest. 
I would prefer to distinguish the non-symmetric (or faintly symmetric) metaphors, such as 
“man is a wolf,” from the metaphors in which the process of interaction develops to the full. 
With regard to this process, Proust offered a remarkable example in the pages in which he 
describes Elstir’s “Marines”: in this artist’s paintings, the sea is described with terrestrial pred-
icates, and the earth with marine predicates. The outstanding metaphors are metamorphoses, 
and here the metamorphosis is truly reciprocal (Proust, Recherche I 835–38; “In the shadow of 
young girls in flower” 415). 
Whoever considers this example, which covers several pages, cannot help but judge the 
conception of the metaphor as being the substitution of one word for another, as being inap-
propriate, anachronistic, not to say ridiculous. The fact that this was upheld by Jakobson, a 
scholar who knew and loved literature, is quite disconcerting. As for Lacan, it is understandable 
in the 1950s, when structuralism started budding (and Black’s article had not yet aroused such 
great interest), that he was struck by Jakobson’s article, which subsequently met with consid-
erable success. What is important, as we shall shortly see, is that the substitutive concept can 
be abandoned without damaging psychoanalysis, and, if anything, can favour a wider perspec-
tive.17 
(d) why are metaphors created? For two reasons according to the substitutive concept: to 
fill lexical gaps  or for aesthetic reasons. In the first case, the metaphoric quality of the term is 
short-lived, as the figure is codified by use (it becomes a catachresis); in the second case, an 
ornamental word is created which, even when it remains a metaphor, never has a cognitive 
value, that is it cannot be judged to be either true or false. As Greek philosophy had already 
clarified, the minimum dimension of any formulation that claims to be true is the statement: 
 
17 Then again, Lacan himself knew how to quote metaphor-statements, for example: “Love is a pebble 
that laughs in the sun” (“L’amour est un caillou riant dans le soleil”; Paul Eluard) (The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan: The Psychoses 226). 
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“cat” is neither true nor false; whereas, we could judge the cognitive value of “cats are ani-
mals,” etc. 
Although Aristotle had reduced the metaphor to the size of a word, with happy incon-
sistency, he had attributed to it cognitive potentialities, acknowledging that it also has the abil-
ity to describe with precision: whoever creates a good metaphor is comparable to an archer 
who hits the target, since he is endowed with eustochia (Aristotle, Rhetoric, III 1412a). Max Black 
is, therefore, a neo-Aristotelian, who has been able to give coherence to Aristotle’s better in-
tuition.  But, in what way can a metaphor generate knowledge? By affirming that a metaphor 
creates similarities more than reflects those already given, he poses a new problem: his theory 
is incomprehensible as a result of the concept of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei, according to 
which to know means to reflect as faithfully as possible what actually is. As I have specified 
elsewhere, this concept implies that a true statement can be produced only in the modal blend-
ing of actuality, and by means of a separative style. The modal revolution questions this dogma, 
showing that various modal blends and various styles of rationality are possible. As already 
stated, desire is never simply a fact: the truth of the desire derives from interpretation. And 
the metaphor may be considered a mode of interpretation. 
Let’s now examine the problem of access to the Symbolic. For Freud, the door of law has 
a guardian, who is no less severe although less enigmatic than the one depicted in Kafka’s 
parable. By definition, the law is impersonal, anonymous: it applies unconditionally to every-
one, even the person issuing it. It becomes an arbitrary act when it evolves from the will of an 
individual: consequently, Antigone calls the prohibition to bury Polynices a decree (kerygma), and 
reminds the tyrant that a kerygma does not have the theoretical foundations of a nomos or of the 
ágrapta nómima (the laws not written by the gods) (Sophocles, Antigone 450–55). The law must not 
absorb drives that contradict universality, as for example the desire for revenge or pointless cru-
elty. When it respects this condition, the law is not simply a prohibition, but a limitation that 
generates new possibilities. In the Oedipus complex, the prohibition of incest, issued by the 
father, is what makes the process of civilization possible, the passage from Nature to Culture, so 
the formation of a subject who would otherwise remain fixed with a desire for fusion. Oedipus 
is a cut, an act of articulation that dilates and extends the space of life. 
But the law is not a dematerialized voice shouting in the void, it always needs an incarna-
tion. The Freudian father is a threatening figure, although the threat of castration belongs to 
the dimension that for Lacan is the Imaginary. He (the father) is so, regardless of his psychic 
and environmental reality, and of the traits characterizing him as an individual: even a kind 
father can be castrating (Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Formations of the Unconscious 
[from now on, Seminar V] 151). Outlining the three times of the Oedipus complex, Lacan 
added to the first time, that is of the tendency towards a fusion between the mother and baby 
boy (the primary perversion), and to the second time, the one in which the father’s prohibition 
intervenes (the terrible father), a third time, in which the figure of interdiction shows himself 
as the father of the gift (189). He is the father who humanizes life: “Castration is not actual cas-
tration. It’s linked to a desire, as I have said. It’s even linked to the evolution, progress and 
maturation of desire in the human subject” (289). As Recalcati underlines, symbolic castration—
because this is how it should be understood—is not a punitive act or merely privative, but 
rather the way in which “the transmission of the desire in the chain of generations” occurs 
(Recalcati, Jacques Lacan 178). 
Freud’s fundamental concepts are reinterpreted by means of the theory of registers: the 
figure of the father will be different in the perspective of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the 
Real. In the Oedipus complex, the father of the Law is a figure of the Symbolic. More precisely, 
says Lacan, “the father is a metaphor” (Lacan, Seminar V 158). And what is a metaphor? Be-
cause Lacan refers to Jakobson, he replies—and he could not reply otherwise—that a meta-
phor is a substitution: “A metaphor … is a signifier that comes to take the place of another 
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signifier.” And again: “The father’s function in the Oedipus complex is to be a signifier sub-
stituted for the first signifier introduced into symbolization, the maternal signifier. According 
to the formula that, as I once explained to you, was the formula for metaphor, the father comes 
to the place of the mother” (159). 
On the previous pages, I referred to the reasons why this concept has now become obsolete 
and, above all, is misleading: its plausibility concerns only the simplest and most stereotypical 
cases. Can we content ourselves with this impoverished and distorted vision of the metaphor 
when we decide to examine the access to the Symbolic? Evidently not. However, it is a matter 
of showing the damage caused by the Jakobson-Lacan version. 
The Law inhabits the space of the Other (symbolic). Its form is necessarily impersonal, as 
the universality to which it aspires involves overcoming the traits characterizing this or that 
individual. Therefore, the Law corresponds to a Code, to a set of rules that tend towards uni-
vocity and rigidity. And yet, as Lacan recalls, “The Other isn’t purely and simply the locus of 
this perfectly organized and fixed system” (Lacan, Seminar V 438). In its deliberately and fa-
natically anonymous version, the Law becomes something inhuman, and it is not able to in-
troduce the subject to the dimension of desire. However, a plurality of versions of the Law exists 
and in one of these versions, the Father intervenes, not as a bearer or executor of the law, but 
rather as a fruitful supplement, a humanizing incarnation, in which he returns to exist as a 
person: he is the father of the gift, capable of showing something beyond the anonymous law. 
Lacan spoke of an additional message (136), and this indication was enhanced and developed 
by Recalcati in the sense of a testimony. The third time of the Oedipus complex is the one in 
which the father becomes the testimony of the singularity of desire (see Recalcati, Cosa resta del 
padre?; and Jacques Lacan 180). 
I believe that this line of thought should be further developed. To overcome the perspec-
tive of the Symbolic crushed on the Law, it is not enough to insist on the need for the Law to 
become incarnate. As we have already said, the bar of the Great Other cannot be seen only as 
a sign of incompleteness, and must instead introduce the pluralism of styles: only in this way 
does the Symbolic become a divided register, within which the subject can experiment all the 
possibilities that are opened by its divisions. 
But this is not enough: we need to introduce another distinction, to rid ourselves of the 
oppression exerted by the “code/message.” We must recognize two fundamental modes of 
Culture, which can express itself on the side of rules, but also on the side of the texts. I present 
the following diagram, before commenting on it: 
 
 The Symbolic  
   
the rules (tendency to be rigid) 
anonymous statements 
the  codes 
the code/message dialectic 
the desire to be, subordinated to 
the desire to have 
the undivided subject (even if artic-
ulate) 
ethics of the Law 
 the texts 
personal versions 
the models 
the rain of styles 
the desire to be (as conflict be-
tween 
coincidence and non-coincidence) 
the modally divided subject 
ethics of the Form 
Fig. 3. Two fundamental modes of Culture. 
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The fact that there are two modes of functioning of Culture, one directed towards rules 
and codes, the other towards texts and singularity, is one of the fundamental theses in Lot-
man’s semiotics (see Universe of the Mind). This typology does not exclude the possibility that 
both can act in a certain vision of the world, with alternating prevalence: in this way, Christi-
anity is founded  both on rules (the ten commandments) and on an individual figure, Jesus, 
who offers himself as a modelling force (Imitatio Christi). 
So, the Symbolic consists of two paths, which at certain times (and in certain cultures) may 
appear to be complementary, but they always end up fighting each other as they correspond 
to two modes of desire. On one side, the desire to have, which has to reckon with the Law as 
society cannot agree to its excesses; in this direction, the desire to be is not absent, but is 
shaped by the Law; and, as we will shortly see, the mechanism to which it must submit itself 
is not so much the metaphor as the synecdoche. In any case, the possibilities for interpretation 
appear to be quite limited. On the other side, instead, the desire to be unfolds with all its might, 
like a desire without Law. Not without models, but without the filter of the Law.  
This mode of desire has found its highest expression and testimony in literature. It is the 
desire of the characters that we have already mentioned, Emma Bovary, Julien Sorel, Raskol’ni-
kov, etc. Their models are romantic heroines, Napoleon Bonaparte, superior men: the attrac-
tion exerted by the models can be confusive—and, in any case, produce effects of liberation—, 
or distinctive: in this case, the model is a true object of interpretation. It cannot be imitated, 
in fact the possibility of even an inferior imitation is doubted, yet it is considered a source of 
inspiration. The desire to be is the desire for non-coincidence with oneself, driven to the point 
of risking foundering in otherness. It is the desire for a non overcoming. 
What it aims at is a form, a new singularity to be conquered. It is a desire without law 
insofar as it moves in a space that is unknown to the ethics of the law, and which we should 
rather define as an ethics of form. Is this not perhaps the path pointed out by Nietzsche?18 
Accordingly, we need to distinguish the mode of being of those who wish to incarnate the 
Law, even in a non-punitive way (the father of the gift) and the mode of those who want to 
bypass the problem of the father, because nothing good seems to be able to come from any 
incarnation.  This is the path of the artists, some of whom are dangerously exposed to disso-
lution as the inevitable outcome unless they know how to create a new language (or if they 
invent a language that is too close to das Ding). 
This is why the two paths of the formation of a subject end up fighting each other: on one 
side, there is a tendency to recognize just one style of thought, and in this case the language 
becomes rigid in the code (and in the code/message dialectic); monostylism imposes itself, 
which is zerostylism; on the other side,  there is the linguistic and logical pluralism, and the 
code corresponds to just one possibility, the separative style. In this perspective, the Oedipus 
complex is the time in which the subject risks losing his own flexibility, the drive to non-
coincidence. 
 
 
11. From the “manque-à-être” to the “n(Ich)t werden” 
The father of the gift may, however, prove to possess more resources than were shown in 
Seminar V: amongst the gifts of life offered by a father, could there also be styles? The jury is 
 
18 Each typology allows for in-between cases, for example Telemachus in The Odyssey who desires the 
return of a father (with whom he is not in conflict and to whom he may look as a model), but also the 
return of the Law, which had been suspended and mocked by the suitors of Penelope. Therefore, a sort 
of hybridization forms in the character of Telemachus, that Recalcati highlighted for its fruitfulness, 
referring to it also as a possibility for contemporary society: a possible identity, different to that of 
Oedipus and Narcissus (Il complesso di Telemaco). 
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still out. I believe, in any case, to have shown that the desire to be is not adequately acknowl-
edged by psychoanalysis due to a privileged orientation towards the dimension of the law. At 
the same time, I have tried to underline the great innovation of “Group Psychology and Anal-
ysis of the Ego” which is the theory of identity as identification. The way of the models, as an 
alternative to that of the law, was perceived and enhanced by Freud. It is certainly so, but with 
considerable limitations, which Lacan never surpassed. Although he distinguished between 
two procedures of identification, imaginary and symbolic, Lacan never investigated the possi-
bilities of non-coincidence. Is perhaps the reason for this inertia to be sought in an inadequate 
conception of non?  
Lacan’s non refers basically to a lack. Why is man the being who does not coincide with 
himself—as Sartre also claimed—unless it is due to a lack of something that empties him at 
least in part of his being? Sartre’s manque-d’être becomes manque-à-être. With this modification, 
the desire of being (that can be reduced to a being, an entity) becomes the desire to be, but the 
aspiration to completeness seems unchanged: all the more so as the lack appears to be caused 
by the lost object, and by the separating action of the law. Maintaining this perspective, it 
seems truly difficult to develop the conception of a limit-surpassing subject.. 
The dissatisfaction with the notion of lack does not legitimize the alternative proposed by 
Deleuze, that is to say desire as production. Desire, as I have tried to define it, is will to 
power—and power cannot be reduced to the production of the multiple, of flows, etc. The 
subject of Deleuze is still an undivided subject, who overflows from himself, but who does not expe-
rience the relationships that the Symbolic consists of unless to a very limited extent. 
To understand more clearly the path of greater flexibility, let’s start again from one of 
Freud’s famous formulations. At the end of lecture 31, he recommends carrying out a task of 
transformation: “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden” (“Where id was, there ego shall be”; New Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis 80). It is well known that this imperative has been misunderstood, as 
if Freud had simply wished to clear up the swamp of drives, to tame wild forces, to “almost 
substitute” the Id with the Ego. But imposing a form on a force does not necessarily mean 
taming, in the sense of depriving it of intensity. Lacan rightly criticized the first French trans-
lation “le moi doit déloger le ça!” (“the ego must dislodge the id”), and the tendency to merge 
the whole subjectivity in the muted (and solidified) area of the Ego; on the contrary, it is nec-
essary to demolish the deceitful constructions of the more emerging part of the psyche. But 
how can Freud’s statement be translated? How can we side with the part of desire, as desire 
to be and therefore of non-coincidence? Perhaps by rewriting the same formulation in German 
with a play on words: “Wo Es war, soll n(Ich)t werden”. Where there was the Id, that is drive, 
and so the inaugural conflict between rigidity and flexibility, the “non” of non-coincidence 
must occur, by dominating the impulse towards the undivided (Seminar V 205). 
 
 
12. For Identification, a Synecdoche Suffices 
Now we are in a position to be able to consider the access to the Symbolic in all its different 
modes. Lacan’s fallacy can be criticized for two reasons, and that is because he believes: (a) 
that metaphors work simply as substitutions; (b) that all substitutions are metaphors. 
The latter error is even more serious than the former.19 The fact that there are non-meta-
phoric substitutions, albeit based on similarity, can be verified immediately in the case of syn-
onyms: but in the relationship between the mother and the father, where the second signifier 
substitutes the first, it is difficult to detect a nexus based on similarity. The father comes in the 
 
19 And it must be entirely attributed to Lacan. Jakobson does not make this mistake, even though he 
creates the condition for it by placing the metaphor on the axis of substitutions.  
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place of the mother, as Lacan says;20 the Law prohibits a double impulse, it sounds like a 
double injunction: one addressed to the child “You will not sleep with your mother,” the other 
to the mother: “You will not reabsorb your fruit” (Lacan, Seminar V 205). It really is difficult 
to understand how we can refer to metaphor. 
A relationship of metaphorization is, on the contrary, recognizable in the relationship be-
tween the boy or girl and the parent of the same sex, who is admired as a model. But this is 
the mode of the Symbolic which does not concern the law, obedience or uniformity to the 
law, but rather the formation of the subject in his or her individuality. Evidently, Lacan con-
fused the two sides, not without some good reason insofar as he felt the need to describe 
access to the Symbolic not only as the interiorization of a code, but as a relationship between 
subjects. Nevertheless, this confusion has led above all to some disadvantages, because it has 
become even more difficult for psychoanalysis to focus its attention on the desire to be. The 
metaphor-substitution represented a tremendous obstacle for the theory of identification. A 
confusive identification could perhaps be described as a substitution: let’s think of a subject x 
who is totally invaded and possessed by alter, who thus takes over his place, deprives him of 
all his subjectivity, as in the mental experiments discussed by Locke, where consideration is 
given for example to the possibility of transferring the psyche of a prince into the body of a 
cobbler, thereby cancelling his previous identity.21 We would have a substitution, but not a 
metaphor, if metaphors (at least complex ones) function according to Black’s description. Yet, 
in the distinctive identifications, if we wish to consider them processes of metaphorization, 
things occur very differently: a subject allows himself to be modelled or metaphorized by an-
other subject, but not in an entirely passive way. On the contrary, he absorbs new energies and 
new perspectives: he is exalted by the emulation, he experiments the possibility of overcoming, 
and can decide whether to remain faithful to this possibility. This is what faithfulness to the desire 
to be consists of as the desire of the non.  
So, let’s try to consider access to the Symbolic as a horizontal and not a symmetrical rela-
tionship between x and alter. Alter is a model, but is it necessarily a metaphor? Would it be one 
even if the subject were to interiorize just one trait, ein einziger Zug, to go back to Freud’s words? 
If precision is one of our objectives, would it not be more advantageous to define this case as 
a synecdoche? Let us consider another literary example, the speech addressed by the father to 
D’Artagnan at the beginning of Dumas’ novel: 
 
“You are young. You ought to be brave for two reasons: the first is that you are a Gascon, and 
the second is that you are my son. Never fear quarrels, but seek adventures . . . to propose an 
example to you – not mine, for I myself have never appeared at court. . . . I speak of Monsieur 
de Tréville . . . captain of the Musketeers; that is to say, chief of a legion of Caesars, whom the 
king holds in great esteem, and whom the cardinal dreads. . . . Still further, Monsieur de Tréville 
gains ten thousand crowns a year; he is therefore a great noble. He began as you begin. Go to 
him with this letter, and make your model in order that you may do as he has done.” (4) 
 
Here a father addresses his son’s desire to be, and his ideal, specifying a model, compared 
to which the father himself is an imperfect duplicate: a simple model, recognizable in just a 
few basic characteristics. In order for the emulation to be successful, it must possess just one 
trait, which the young protagonist has without doubt already inherited from his father: cour-
age. It is a trait that in Gascon is passed down from one generation to the next, and so it 
 
20 “What is the paternal metaphor ? Strictly speaking . . . it’s the substitution of the father as a symbol 
or signifier in the place of the mother” (Lacan, Seminar V 164). 
21 See Locke, Essay on human understanding (1690), and cf. science fiction films, for example Invasion of the 
Body Snatchers.  
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corresponds to what, according to Freud, is sufficient for constructing a collective identity, 
capable of reuniting people who may even differ as far as all the rest is concerned. When the 
process of identification is set in motion by just one trait (ein einziger Zug), it would be more 
appropriate to speak of synecdoche, and not of metaphor. In all these cases, identification is 
basically rigid, and the subjects are relatively simple personalities.22 
So, it seems we must not limit ourselves to the metaphor, but use a typology. It should be 
understood that each rhetorical mechanism will be defined as a horizontal relationship between (at least) two 
terms—and that it will no longer fall back into the substitutive conception. There are four 
possible minimum combinations: inclusion (synecdoche), intersection (or better still focalizing 
action: metaphor), proximity (metonymy), contrast/overturning (antithesis, irony, oxymoron). 
In this way, four figural areas take shape, and the construction of identity, in the Symbolic 
crossed by the desire to be, can be studied along four main paths. Due to a question of space, 
I am not able to explain this typology in more detail here, or present the examples confirming 
it on this occasion.23 But it would be important to maintain the distinction even just between 
synecdoche and metaphor.24 
 
 
13. From the Square of Modalities to the Logic of Correlatives 
In section 3, I affirmed that “the” logic does not exist, that is the logic unaccompanied by an 
adjective that explicitly and honestly declares its style. However, we should not underrate the 
force of illusion that expresses itself in the definite article: for many centuries, faith or super-
stition that drive people to believe in just one logic, in monostylism, dominated almost unop-
posed; the only exception is represented by Heraclitus, whose aphorisms required interpreta-
tion. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the conjunctive logics burst onto 
the philosophical scene: we must use the plural, because this family of logics was penalized at 
length due to a lack of clarity. What is the relationship that plays a strategic and decisive role 
in this family? The contraries or the correlatives? In the first case, there is the possibility of a 
synthesis, which is lacking in the second because the correlatives, we should never forget, are 
non-synthesizable opposites. Let’s consider two paradigmatic examples: being and nothing, at 
the beginning of Hegel’s logic, and the relationship between master and servant, mentioned 
by Aristotle in what was the first and fundamental typology of oppositive relationships. In the 
first case, a synthesis is performed, which generates the becoming, in the second there is no 
synthesis and neither could there be one.  
 
22 See Freud’s example, hysterical schoolgirls (“Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego”). 
23 I explained this conception of figural mechanisms in Retorica. L’intelligenza figurale nell’arte e nella filosofia. 
I take the liberty of referring in particular to the chapter “Retorica del personaggio.” 
24 The interactional concept of the metaphor offers new possibilities of interpretation for the Fort/Da, 
that Lacan indicated as a paradigm for the process of symbolization (and metaphorization). In a con-
ference at IRPA (Milan, 23 February 2019), Massimo Recalcati outlined a typology of great interest, 
which certainly deserves further investigation. Starting from the hypothesis that it is the Father who 
guarantees the good functioning of the relationship, the fracture between Fort and Da may be considered 
pathogenic: on one side, the dominion of the Da, the inflated presence of the object (maniacal behavior, 
the Capitalist Discourse), on the other, the merciless establishment of the Fort, in the new forms of 
melancholy. In the latter case, the subject is nailed to himself as bare existence, lack of sense (lack of 
that semantization that only the advent of a S2, of a metaphorizing element, could confer). If I have 
understood Recalcati’s observations correctly, I must conclude that the substitution—the Da that in-
vades the space of the Fort, and vice versa—is a cause of pathologies, wherever the interaction is a state 
of health (however, neurosis remains to be considered as a partial invasion and “distorted” interaction). 
In any case, a good theory of the metaphor is also able to throw light on psychic mechanisms. 
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Although he often uses correlatives in The Phenomenology of Spirit and elsewhere, Hegel seems 
to preserve the primacy of the contraries. His conception, and the oscillations characterizing 
it, have never been adequately clarified because scholars of Hegelian Dialectic have never been 
able to understand the polysemy of the opposites, and the conflict between rigid logic and 
flexible logic.  Be that as it may, the path of synthesis is not the only one to have been experi-
mented in the field of conjunctive logics: that of Nietzsche and Heidegger is a logic of the 
non-synthesizable, and one of Heidegger’s key terms, the Zusammengehörigkeit, the co-belong-
ing, shows quite clearly the perspective used by the author of Being and Time. Nonetheless, as 
we have already recalled in section 3, Heidegger never knew how to articulate and develop this 
perspective.  
Let us now examine the classical doctrine of modalities and the use made of it by Lacan. 
Lacan’s dissatisfaction with formal logic was manifested on several occasions, and yet it must 
be admitted that he did not know how to escape the cage of disjunctive logics.  His subjection 
to this logical style is confirmed by his resumption of the square of modalities in Seminar XX 
(The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge 59, 144): 
 
Necessary  Impossible 
  
Possible Contingent 
Fig. 4. The square of modalities. 
The partiality of this construction consists in recognizing that only two types of relationship 
are essential and indispensable: that between contradictories and that between contraries (the 
relationship between subcontraries does not add anything on a conceptual level). Between 
necessary and contingent, and between impossible and possible, there is a relationship of con-
tradiction, that is of incompatibility (something is necessary or it is contingent). The logical 
square, in its terministic version, allows for a blending of contraries: white and black can create 
grey, male and female the androgynous.25 Furthermore, there is no automatism in the genesis 
of hybrid cases. As far as modal concepts are concerned, the relationship between contraries 
seems to trace the one between contradictories.26 
In the medieval formulation and in that of mod-
ern logic, the square of opposition performs an es-
sential function: it ordains that the opposites are 
“the most separate” in the set of relationships and 
that a possible hybridization is secondary, in other 
words it never denies the originally disjunctive char-
acter of the oppositions. So, what are we to think 
when we come across the correlatives, in other 
words opposites which, although continuing to oppose each other, mutually imply each other? 
In the separative regime, a contradictory (term or proposition) excludes the simultaneous pres-
ence of its opposite (I am sitting down or I am not sitting down); a contrary can exist without 
implying a constitutive relationship with its stronger alternative (I bought a white car, its ex-
istence does not depend on that of black cars). In the case of correlatives, each term is linked 
to the other: master does not exist without servant, and vice versa. We could visualize it like 
in fig. 5. 
What are the limits of the square of opposition? What is its greatest and most unacceptable 
flaw? Without doubt, it is the zerostylism: it implicitly decrees the inexistence or marginality 
of conjunctive relationships, and the impossibility of a non-disjunctive logic. But that which 
 
25 Cf. the use of carré sémiotique in Greimas’ texts. 
26 It is a problem that should be investigated further. 
Fig. 5. The correlatives 
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for “the” logic would be considered the most marginal relationship, and the weakest (as op-
posites do not oppose each other completely, but they imply each other) becomes the begin-
ning and the engine of a conjunctive and flexible logic: the logic of correlatives, of the linked 
but not synthesizable opposites. 
It should be underlined that this logical style does not deny and does not in any way claim 
to deny—as was stated in the past and as is unwisely repeated even today—the principle of 
non-contradiction, but only its rigid version. In my book La ragione flessibile, I tried to open a 
space in which the logic of correlatives could finally emerge, without the confusion and opac-
ity, without the uncertainties and inhibitions that have always prevented even the announce-
ment of its foundations. There is still a lot of work to be done, but perhaps this path has finally 
been opened up. There is a passage in Nietzsche that could be considered “the great announce-
ment” of the correlatives: 
 
Just now my world became perfect, midnight is also noon— 
Pain is also a joy, a curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun—go away or else you will learn: a 
wise man is also a fool. 
Have you ever said Yes to one joy? O my friends, then you also said Yes to all pain. All things 
are enchained, entwined, enamored. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra 263)27 
     
It is certainly not surprising that this vision is affirmed by a philosopher who is also an 
extraordinary writer, in a book that is a perfect hybridization between philosophy and litera-
ture. But the implicit logic must become explicit, unless it wants to remain in a sort of limbo: 
its principles must be clarified – particularly, as we have seen, because the family of conjunctive 
logics includes different versions including Hegel’s mediated synthesis and Deleuze’s immedi-
ate synthesis (coincidentia oppositorum). 
The flaws of disjunctive logic do not only concern the strictly logical sphere, but they ex-
tend to ontology. How could it be otherwise? Can we believe that a rigid logic is able to de-
scribe non-rigid individuals, that a logic of identity-coincidence is able to analyze non-coincid-
ing subjects?  Let’s go back to Shakespeare’s work, aware of the fact that there are different 
modes of overcoming, and that Hamlet’s mode of overcoming is by no means a foregone 
conclusion. However, we have reached a certainty: it is not possible to enroll any complex individual 
in the logical square, if complexity means “overcoming force” and logic of correlatives.28 
 
 
14. Lacan’s Errors in the Reading of Hamlet—The Two Extremes in 
Shakespeare’s Character 
According to Lacan, Freud made crucial progress with his interpretation of Hamlet, moving 
the problem of indecision from an intellectual plane (which had, until then, been preferred, 
with reference to some of Shakespeare’s verses: “Thus conscience does make cowards of us 
all, /And thus the native hue of resolution /is sickled o’er with the pale cast of thought”; 
Hamlet III.1.82–84), to that of desire. Hamlet cannot take revenge as he identifies himself in 
the individual who killed his father and married his mother, thus fulfilling his oedipal desires. 
 
27 “Eben ward meine Welt vollkommen, Mitternacht ist auch Mittag, - Schmerz ist auch eine Lust, 
Flucht ist auch ein Segen, Nacht ist auch eine Sonne, - geht davon oder ihr lernt: ein Weiser ist auch ein 
Narr. / Sagtet ihr jemals Ja zu Einer Lust? Oh, meine Freunde, so sagtet ihr Ja auch zu allem Wehe. Alle 
Dinge sind verkettet, verfädelt, verliebt” (Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra 402). 
28 To avoid any misunderstanding: the following propositions may be included in the square, “all indi-
viduals are complex,” “no individual is complex,” “some individuals are complex,” “some individuals 
are not complex.” However, it is not possible to introduce the relationships that give rise to the complexity.  
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A strong point in Freud’s reading consists in having observed how Hamlet is anything but 
incapable of action in general: “We see him doing so on two occasions: first in a sudden out-
burst of temper, when he runs his swords through the eavesdropper behind the arras, and 
secondly in a premeditated and even crafty fashion, when, with all the callousness of a Renais-
sance prince, he sends the two courtiers to the death that had been planned for himself” 
(Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams 367). Therefore, the reason that caused the paralysis must 
be sought in desire. According to Lacan, however, it must be sought not only in Hamlet’s 
desire for his mother, but even more so in the desire of the mother (subjective genitive), in 
other words, in the fact that the queen seems to be dominated by an unbridled lust (Lacan, Le 
séminaire VI 339). Indeed, so unbridled is her lust that she is unable to distinguish between the 
objects of her sexual appetite: this is what the prince reproaches Gertrude for, placing under 
her gaze, in the closet scene, two miniatures depicting the old king and Claudius. The idealized 
description of the father is contrasted with the repugnant semblance of the second husband. 
Gertrude’s indifference towards the objects of her desire is inconceivable for Hamlet: 
 
Sense sure you have, 
Else could you not have motion, but sure that sense 
Is apoplexed, for madness would not err, 
Nor sense to ecstasy was ne’er so thrilled, 
But it reserved some quantity of choice 
To serve in such a difference. (III.4.71–76) 
 
Why should this ungovernable and rather indiscriminate lust prevent Hamlet from killing 
Claudius? (If anything, it justifies the ghost’s concern regarding an act of violence that Hamlet 
may be tempted to commit against his mother). It seems that, for Lacan, the protagonist’s 
incapacity to act reflects his mother’s inability to choose: an explanation that leaves us some-
what doubtful. No less disconcerting is the explanation of the reason why Hamlet has lost the 
path of desire: this supposedly derives from his voluntary renunciation of Ophelia.29 Being 
deprived of any object, his desire has been sucked into the orbit of maternal desire.   
Therefore, it is only the reconstruction of the object that renders the impossible act possi-
ble, and this occurs, according to Lacan, in the scene of Ophelia’s funeral, and more specifically 
when Hamlet jumps into the grave where Laertes has descended to embrace his sister for the 
last time. What is the motive for this gesture? Later on, Hamlet will explain the reason to 
Horatio, stating that it was “the bravery of his grief” (V.2.79) that aroused his anger. In any 
case, for Lacan  “this is the moment that generates in Hamlet what allows him to recover his 
desire”;30 and also his identity, because before jumping into the grave, he proclaims: “This is 
I, Hamlet the Dane” (V.1.224). 
This thesis does not appear to be very convincing insofar as Hamlet continues not to act: 
in fact, in the final scene, he first puts himself at the service of Claudius; and will manage to 
kill the king only when he discovers that he has been mortally wounded. In other words, the 
protagonist continues to exist in the time of procrastination. 
Shortly, we will examine other claims made by Lacan that are even weaker and more un-
founded than those mentioned until now; however, more than the errors, it is the partiality of 
the perspective that must be underlined and rejected. Who is Hamlet for Lacan? As much as 
he wants to distance himself from the traditional interpretations, and also that of Freud, for 
Lacan Hamlet remains a paralyzed subject. A falterer, a neurotic (even though Lacan is 
 
29 “[I]l n’a plus de désir – Ophélie a été rejetée” (Lacan, Le séminaire VI 339). 
30 “[C]’est là le moment où ce produit dans Hamlet ce qui lui permet de ressaisir son désir” (Lacan, Le 
Séminaire VI 342). 
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cautious about using clinical labels). The hero of deferment: “our Hamlet procrastinates and 
procrastinates throughout the play, thus making it the work of procrastination par excel-
lence”.31 As can be seen, we are perfectly in line with tradition. This is why Lacan’s reading, 
which remains subordinated to Oedipus, is so disappointing. 
This point must be clarified. As we have already said, the primacy of the desire to have 
does not imply that the desire to be is completely absent, but rather that it does not manifest 
itself unless it is in subordinate forms. Incorporating “the phallus” into Shakespeare’s most 
famous line (Lacan, Le Séminaire VI 258) does not take us any further than Oedipus and the 
Symbolic crushed on the Law. According to Lacanian doctrine, desire (on the part of the boy) 
to be the phallus of the mother is a response to the cannibalistic desire attributed to the ma-
ternal other. In conclusion, it is in the mother’s desire to have that the root of the child’s desire 
to be is found. The function of the father consists in prohibiting both desires.   
Here is the great limitation of this approach: for Lacan, the desire to be is never creative. The 
paths of identification are fundamentally reduced to the desire to be the phallus (and so an 
imaginary, confusive identification) and to the desire to be the parent of the same sex, along a 
metaphoric-substitutive path, that is reduced, in turn, to a synecdoche (introjection of the Ego 
Ideal, limited to oedipal relationships). The Symbolic being Law acts only as castration.  
However, we have seen that there are two modes of culture: rules and texts (Lotman), that 
is the rules to be obeyed, incarnated in rigid individuals, in stereotypes, and the models to be 
emulated and interpreted, that present themselves in the form of fascinating singularities. 
When the subject has to enter the Great Other, he faces two possibilities: imitation and inter-
pretation. In the eyes of D’Artagnan, who exemplifies the first possibility, the Symbolic is a 
“full” and compact space, saturated with sense, in which all the answers to all the questions 
that the subject happens to pose can be found. But for Hamlet, right from the beginning, the 
Symbolic is “out of joint,” it is off its hinges, displaced from those rigid foundations that limit 
its positions, its possibilities. 
Perhaps not even one of Lacan’s affirmations is able to withstand close examination. And 
that which is least able to stand up to such scrutiny is the one according to which “Hamlet 
knows that he is guilty of being. Being is unbearable to him. Before any start of the drama, he 
knows the crime of being.”32 Therefore, Hamlet is a character of melancholy: self-reproach 
driven to the guilt of being. Almost as if Silenus’ sentence, “it is best not to have been born at 
all,” had caught up with him prematurely—had reverberated in his mind with a strength un-
weakened by the passing of the centuries. 
Lacan is wrong. Hamlet’s problem is not the senselessness of being, but the desire not to 
be condemned simply to one role, that of the avenger. To assume this role, as Harold Bloom 
noted, any Fortinbras or any Laertes would suffice (4). Hamlet does not resign himself to 
playing a codified part, and his extraordinary life force, his aspiration to singularity emerge in 
this refusal. 
This does not mean that he is unable to feel nostalgia for a simple identity, one of those 
that pass before his eyes, for example that of Fortinbras, who is so sure of himself and of his 
actions – at least outwardly, because his aspirations to reconquer the land lost by his father 
fade away with  an unexpected and rather inglorious rapidity, to the point that we see him ask 
for permission to cross a kingdom that should have been the object of conquest (IV.4.1–4). It 
would be stretching a point to say that we can glimpse a trait of comic foolishness in the ardour 
with which he prepares to fight with his soldiers “for a plot / Whereon the numbers cannot 
try the cause, / Which is not tomb enough and continent / To hide the slain” (IV.4.62–65)? 
 
31 “[N]otre Hamlet procrastine, et tout au long de la pièce, ce qui en fait par excellence la pièce de la 
procrastination” (Lacan, Le Séminaire VI 293). 
32 “Lui, Hamlet, sait qu’il est coupable d’être. Il lui est insupportable d’être. Avant tout commencement 
du drame, il connaît le crime d’exister” (Lacan, Le Séminaire VI  293). 
To Be and Not to Be: Hamlet’s Identity 
Giovanni Bottiroli 
 Enthymema XXIII 2019 / 281 
Is Hamlet’s admiration truly genuine? Must we believe him when he affirms that “Rightly to 
be great / Is not to stir without great argument, / But greatly to find quarrel in a straw / When 
honour’s at the stake” (IV.4.53–56)? He concludes his monologue by saying to himself: “O, 
from this time forth, / My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth” (IV.4.65–66). The fact 
remains that he will continue to postpone the revenge. His noble reflections are only “Words, 
words, words.” 
As far as Laertes is concerned, who for Lacan (and other scholars) is an ideal figure in 
Hamlet’s eyes,33 we should not overlook the involuntary comedy that seeps into his image, and 
which emerges even in the paroxysm of the pain, that is so hyperbolic and stereotyped that 
Hamlet cannot help but mock him: “Woo’t weep, woo’t fight, woo’t fast, woo’t tear thyself? / 
Woo’t drink up eisel, eat a crocodile? / I’ll do’t” (V.1.242–44). And isn’t there something in-
voluntarily ridiculous in the unrelenting desire to revenge a father, when the father is nothing 
but an imbecile? This is how Hamlet judged Polonius: “Thou wretched, rash, intruding fool, 
farewell” (III.4.31). Avenging a father is a possible gesture, before being an obligation, for a 
simple, undivided subject, who coincides with himself; if in this work it becomes an impossible 
action, it is because Hamlet is an overcoming identity. 
What Lacan says about Hamlet not having any more desires is untrue. Rather, he really is 
released from the desire to have, and he exists mainly in the desire to be – which is not the 
desire of completeness, but of non-coincidence. How does Hamlet put his desire of “non” to 
the test? Unlike the leading characters of some modern novels, such as Julien Sorel and 
Raskol’nikov, he does not have a model to emulate and interpret, though he is not lacking in 
anti-models, such as Fortinbras and Laertes. And the father? If Hamlet hesitates to obey his 
commands, is it because of the unclear accusations that the ghost addresses to itself? “I am 
thy father’s spirit, / Doomed for a certain term to walk the night, / And for the day confined 
to fast in fires, / Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature / Are burnt and purged away” 
(I.5.9–13). Foul crimes: whatever they are, they do not exhort Hamlet to assume his father’s 
identity. In the language of Lacan, the A of the Great Other is barred, highlighting the lack of 
signifier for the subject.   
But the bar on the Symbolic, as we said, indicates (or should indicate) much more than a 
lack of something or an incompleteness. Characters such as D’Artagnan find in the complete-
ness of the Symbolic a signifier that can model their future (the father, and Monsieur de Tré-
ville); Hamlet perceives a lack in the Great Other. Is it just a lack? A void that fuels his desire 
to create a singular identity for himself, beyond the role in which the ghost wishes to imprison 
him? The Great Other is barred because it is divided, in the conflictual plurality of the styles 
and of logics. There is not only the lack—the presumed secret of psychoanalysis, according to 
Lacan—,34but rather what psychoanalysis has not understood: the modes of the desire to be, and the 
polemos between coincidence and non-coincidence. 
It is not true, as Lacan says, that Hamlet is unable to work through his bereavement until 
the scene of Ophelia’s funeral: he works through it continuously and creatively in a process in 
which he crosses other identities, starting from his refusal to be a simple avenger.  He over-
comes the models that present themselves before him, the father, but also Fortinbras and 
Laertes, and the actor who acts out Claudius’ crime. One of these identities is the Ego of the 
past, Ophelia’s beloved. The Ego of the desire to have shatters, Hamlet regresses as far as the 
 
33 “Pour Hamlet, celui-ci est une sorte de semblable ou de double plus beau que lui-même”; “Hamlet . . . 
trouve un rival à sa taille dans ce semblable remodelé” (“For Hamlet, Laertes is a sort of  similar being 
or a double, who more handsome than he is”; “Hamlet . . . finds a rival for his own stature in that 
remodelled double”; Lacan, Le Séminaire VI 394). 
34 “C’est, si je puis dire, le grand secret de la psychanalyse. Le grand secret, c’est – il n’y a pas d’Autre de 
l’Autre” (“If we can say this, this is the great secret of psychoanalysis. The great secret is that there is 
no Other of the Other”; Lacan, Le Séminar VI 353). 
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condition of a corps morcelé in the scene, mentioned in section 6, in which he disintegrates in the 
eyes of his beloved maiden. He returns to the condition of an x who does not recognize him-
self within his own boundaries, and who has to overcome them. Hamlet’s path is that of the 
tragic hero, that is of a double movement towards the extremes. 
 
 
The traditional interpreta-
tions, to which those of Freud 
and Lacan also belong, despite 
their originality, contemplated 
only one of the extremes: the 
mysterious paralysis of the will, 
the time of procrastination, in 
an indecisive, neurotic and 
helpless subject, for whom it 
seems that his time, the time for 
revenge, never comes. Hamlet’s 
creativity—the desire to be, the 
desire not to confine himself to 
one role, the time of interpreta-
tion, of invention—has been 
neglected. When he rewrites the 
actors’ pièce, the prince experi-
ences himself as an artist. But 
he is constantly an artist, a tight-
rope walker on the wire of lan-
guage: for this purpose, he puts 
on the mask of the fool. 
I will try to summarize the 
double movement towards the 
extremes, resuming the diagram 
of the tragic hero, of the char-
acter who goes beyond average-
ness without having a reference 
model: see fig. 6. 
The two extremes are recip-
rocally linked: like all the great characters of literature, Hamlet is conflictual, but also comprised 
of conflict. In the area of averageness we must place the revenge tragedy, the plot that Hamlet 
refuses to perform, experiencing guilt for this refusal. Inventing oneself is not a simple task, 
and overcoming is not a leap “outside rigidity”: this outside does not exist.35 
 
 
15. A Parricide? 
Nor could this outside exist in the field of research. All the criticisms that I have levelled at 
Lacan presuppose the exceptional progress that he allowed to be made, not only in psychoa-
nalysis, but in the philosophy of the modal revolution. There is no need to underline the 
 
35 Readers who expected a deeper analysis of Hamlet will probably be disappointed. However, for obvi-
ous reasons of space, I had to limit myself to dealing with the fundamental problem. This does not 
exclude the possibility of further studies in the future. 
 the fool 
the desire to be 
flexibility – non-coincidence 
the artist 
time of interpretation 
 
 time of procrastination 
the neurotic 
 rigidity 
the Oedipal desire 
the indecisive 
Fig. 6. Hamlet’s identity. 
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importance of the theory of registers as an acquisition; however, the investigation into the 
modes must be pushed beyond rigidity that the Lacanian school has emphasized, instead of 
questioning. 
Killing a father may be an act that favours his resurrection, as Freud demonstrated in Totem 
and Taboo. And such a resurrection may take place in the Symbolic, understood in its vaster 
meaning, as the register of a creative sublimation, of an inheritance to be interpreted. 
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